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The Impact of Uncertainty Regarding
Patent Eligible Subject Matter for
Investment in U.S. Medical Diagnostic
Technologies
A. Sasha Hoyt*
Abstract
Historically, 35 U.S.C. § 101, the statute governing patent
eligible subject matter, has been construed broadly—with its
legislative history indicating that it should cover “anything
under the sun that is made by man.” The Supreme Court crafted
three exceptions to § 101: (1) abstract ideas, (2) laws of nature,
and (3) natural phenomena. In recent years, the Supreme Court’s
eligibility jurisprudence has further narrowed § 101 to effectively
exclude meritorious medical diagnostic methods. Indeed, since
the Court’s decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Federal Circuit has held
every single diagnostic method claim brought before it patent
ineligible.
This Note begins by discussing the merits of medical
diagnostic tests and their relevance to modern precision
medicine. It then dissects the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bilski
v. Kappos and Mayo, highlighting the uncertainty regarding
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patent eligibility of medical diagnostic methods following these
cases and the Federal Circuit’s application of the Court’s
Alice/Mayo test. This uncertainty has rippled through the
medical diagnostic and venture capital industries, sparking
concerns about under-investment in diagnostic R&D.
The heart of this Note is an empirical study of venture
capital investment in disease diagnostic technologies before and
after Bilski and Mayo. Using a difference-in-difference
methodology to analyze venture capital investment data from the
PriceWater Clearinghouse Moneytree Tool, this Note examines
whether current § 101 jurisprudence has caused these selective
investors to decrease investment in companies developing
medical diagnostics technologies that—in light of Mayo and its
progeny—appear to be patent ineligible. Ultimately, the study
indicates that in the four years following Mayo, investment in
disease diagnostic technologies was nearly $9.3 billion dollars
lower than it would have been absent Mayo.
This Note presents five key implications related to its central
finding. First, the data supports the recent calls to Congress for
reform of § 101. Second, it complements other key research
regarding investment behavior following Mayo and Alice. Third,
the data raises the question whether remaining innovation in the
diagnostics space will be enough to support the precision
medicine movement. Fourth, underinvestment in diagnostics
and the discovery of disease biomarkers may lead to
underinvestment in treatments. Lastly, this Note’s findings
suggest that at least some venture capital firms employ greater
caution when determining whether to invest in a company
developing (or aiming to develop) diagnostics, which may spur
hesitancy to form such companies in the first place.
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INTRODUCTION
Why would anyone in their right mind risk
millions if not billions of dollars to develop a
product when they have no idea if they’re eligible
for protection? From a business perspective, it
simply isn’t worth the risk for many endeavors.
Sen. Thom Tillis1
Have you been swabbed to check for COVID-19? Has a
doctor analyzed your blood or urine when assessing your health?
If you answered “yes” to either of these questions, you have
experienced the benefits of medical diagnostic testing. Most
obviously, medical diagnostics enable physicians to identify
conditions and diseases in their patients from the
mundanesuch as a blood typing testto those serious,
concerning conditions requiring further treatmentsuch as
COVID-19 and various cancers.2 Diagnostics are especially
important for patients with rare diseases and conditions such as
Philadelphia-chromosome-positive (Ph+) chronic myeloid
leukemia (CML), an aggressive cancer that has become
increasingly treatable due to the discovery of its genetic
biomarker.3 Physicians also use medical diagnostic testing
preventatively, enabling the diagnosis of diseases and
conditions at earlier stages of severity and thus improving
patient outcomes. 4 But these benefits often come at a great cost,

1. The State of Patent Eligibility in America, Part I, 116th Cong. 3:3247
(2019) (opening statement of Sen. Thom Tillis).
2. See PERSONALIZED MED. COALITION, THE PERSONALIZED MEDICINE
REPORT: OPPORTUNITY, CHALLENGES, AND THE FUTURE 5 (2017) [hereinafter
PMC REPORT], https://perma.cc/TPA5-EH7E (PDF) (detailing the use of
diagnostic tests by physicians to “identify specific biological markers, often
genetic, that help determine which medical treatments and procedures will
work best for each patient”).
3. See infra Part II for a detailed discussion of the diagnostic testing for
this cancer.
4. See PMC REPORT, supra note 2, at 5 (“By combining this information
with an individual’s medical records, circumstances, and values, personalized
medicine allows doctors and patients to develop targeted treatment and
prevention plans.”).
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from $20 million to over $100 million to develop diagnostic tests
for rare diseases, according to a survey in 2013.5
Patent protection has historically offered an incentive for
the up-front expenditures required to create new diagnostic
methods. Indeed, for many start-ups that develop new,
cutting-edge technologies, patent rights are a lifeline in the
quest to obtain venture capital investment, to survive in
competitive markets, and to commercialize their products.6
However, this incentive has become less powerful in recent
years because of increasing uncertainty regarding the scope of
patent-eligible subject matter.
Scholars and practitioners studying recent changes in
standards of patent eligibility seem to agree that “[p]atent law
is in a state of crisis.”7 Even Andrei Iancu, the former Director
of the United States Patent Office (USPTO), has expressed
concern about murky patent eligibility jurisprudence.8 In a
nutshell, Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedents have
effectively turned 35 U.S.C. § 101,9 the statute governing
patentable subject matter, into a brick wall rather than a sieve
when applying it to medical diagnostic methods. Indeed,
scholars and practitioners have expressed alarm about the
“remarkably complex” analysis required “[f]or a simple
‘threshold’ eligibility test.”10
5. See PETER KEELING ET AL., DIACEUTICS, MYSTERY SOLVED! WHAT IS THE
COST TO DEVELOP AND LAUNCH A DIAGNOSTIC? 1, https://perma.cc/HAQ4-RB7N
(PDF) (reporting in 2013 that “on average the cost of developing and
commercializing a diagnostic properly in the US is $50 million to $75 million”).
6. See Stuart J. H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent,
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1078 (2008) (“[I]ncreased patenting by
venture-backed companies in the software and biotech industries is
significantly correlated with total investment, total number of financing
rounds, and firm longevity . . . .”).
7. David O. Taylor, The Crisis of Patent Eligibility in America, 4
CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 733, 733 (2019) [hereinafter Taylor, Crisis of
Patent Eligibility].
8. See Ryan Davis, Courts Can Resolve Patent Eligibility Problems,
Iancu Says, LAW360 (Apr. 11, 2019, 5:19 PM), https://perma.cc/4R52-ZM9L
(quoting Andrei Iancu as stating, “[T]he current state of Section 101 is a
problem”).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
10. Paul Michel & John Battaglia, New Enablement-Like Requirements
for 101 Eligibility: AAM v. Neapco Takes the Case Law Out of Context, and Too
Far—Part I, IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/M87D-JQ42.
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This Note presents the first study that empirically
examines venture capital investments to determine the impact
of the Supreme Court’s decisions restricting patent eligible
subject matter in Bilski v. Kappos11 and Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.12 on investment in
medical diagnostic technologies. In particular, this Note
demonstrates that there has been a modest but significant
adverse effect on venture capital investment in medical
diagnostics following these cases.13
To reach that conclusion, Part I of this Note examines the
relationship between patents and innovation. Part II then
explains the importance of medical diagnostics to modern
personalized medicine and discusses the impact of medical
diagnostic testing on individuals with rare diseases and
conditions. Part III dissects the Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit’s contemporary decisions regarding the judicial
exclusions to § 101. Part III concludes with an analysis of what
patent protection remains for medical diagnostic methods in the
wake of caselaw that renders most diagnostics patent ineligible.
Part IV transitions to the discussion of venture capital
investment perspectives, the impact of uncertainty on
investment-making decisions, and innovation as it relates to
medical diagnostics and § 101. Part V outlines the experimental
methodology for this projecta difference-in-difference analysis
measuring the impact of Bilski and Mayo on venture capital
investment rates in disease diagnosis technologies versus all
technologies. Part VI discusses the results of the
difference-in-difference analysis, ultimately finding that Bilski
and Mayo have had a negative impact on venture capital
investment rates in disease diagnosis technologies. Lastly, Part
VII presents several important implications of this finding as it
relates to § 101 doctrine and the development of new medical
diagnostic technologies.

11.
12.
13.

561 U.S. 593 (2010).
566 U.S. 66 (2012).
See infra Part VI.
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PATENTS AND INNOVATION

Intellectual property, by its nature, is “non-rivalrous,” with
large up-front transaction costs to produce and little to no
transaction costs to duplicate.14 The patent system restores
rivalrousness to intellectual property by granting a limited
monopoly on the right to exclude others from using said
property, thereby incentivizing investment in innovation.15
Economic incentives of patents, which stem from the right to
exclude, include the ability to charge “monopoly rent” for use of
a patented technology (for example, issuing a license).16
Proponents of the patent system thus believe that stronger
patent rights correlate with willingness to invest in the research
and development (R&D) of new technologies.17 Further, the
disclosure requirements of the patent system “increase[] the
flow of ideas and stimulate[] innovation” by improving the
public knowledge of science and other technical fields.18 And
because patentholders have the right to exclude public uses of
their inventions, patents “incentivize ingenuity by encouraging

14. See David W. Barnes, Congestible Intellectual Property and Impure
Public Goods, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 533, 53334 (2011) (explaining
the property-as-information theory); Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Patent Rights in
a Climate of Intellectual Property Rights Skepticism, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
103, 116 (2016) (“A basic economic premise underlies the patent system:
technologies are expensive to invent but easy to copy.”).
15. See Ohlhausen, supra note 14, at 11617 (arguing that, absent the
patent rights scheme, “positive externalities will cause suboptimal investment
in innovation”).
16. See Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27
J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 17 (2013) (discussing the argument that patentholders
utilize patents for monopoly rent rather than to increase societal welfare); 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (enumerating the patentee’s right to exclude third parties
from selling, manufacturing, or making use of their invention in the United
States).
17. See, e.g., Brief for National Venture Capital Association as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 910, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) (No. 10-1150) [hereinafter NVCA
Brief] (“[I]n biotechnology, strong patent protection correlates with the
amount of R&D investments made by companies . . . .”).
18. Philip Merksamer, Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom: Metastasis of
Mayo and Myriad and the Evisceration of Patent Eligibility for Molecular
Diagnostics, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 495, 525 (2016).
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the public to design around and improve upon existing patented
technology.”19
On the other side of the table, some patent skeptics,
including Judge Richard Posner, have argued that the patent
system discourages or limits innovation.20 These scholars argue
that robust patent rights produce more costs than benefits,
including the creation of greater barriers to obtain entry in
certain markets and inciting needless litigation.21 However,
many of those who critique the patent system admit that
“[t]here is little doubt that providing a monopoly as a reward for
innovation increases the incentive to innovate.”22
II.

MEDICAL DIAGNOSTICS BACKGROUND

Medical diagnostics are socially valuable, meritorious tools
that can improve public health. The medical diagnostics
industry is broad and ranges from expensive research-driven
testing for specific and rare diseases to routine, general testing
for pregnancy and blood type.23 Certain “diagnostic tests enable
physicians to identify the most effective treatment for a patient
immediately by testing for specific molecular characteristics,
thus avoiding the frustrating and costly practice of
trial-and-error medicine.”24 Such diagnostic tests may operate
19.
20.

Id.
See Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America,
ATLANTIC (July 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/CUR6-K7B4 (discussing problems
with the patent system, notably that patents provide different incentives
across industries); Ohlhausen, supra note 14, at 11012 (discussing popular
critiques of the patent system including the theory that patents provide the
right to block innovation).
21. See Boldrin & Levine, supra note 16, at 58 (rebutting the notion that
patents encourage thoughtful innovation); Note, Diagnostic Method Patents
and Harms to Follow-on Innovation, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1370, 1371 (2013)
(arguing that “granting strong, early patent rights will result in the
underdevelopment of technology,” particularly for “broad diagnostic method
patents”).
22. Boldrin & Levine, supra note 16, at 7.
23. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO TECH. REP. SERIES, NO. 1031, THE
SELECTION AND USE OF ESSENTIAL IN VITRO DIAGNOSTICS 27789 (2021) (listing
essential, disease-specific in vitro diagnostic tests such as tests to diagnose
diabetes, HIV, COVID-19, and influenza); id. at 27576 (listing essential in
vitro diagnostic tests for general use, such as tests to diagnose blood type,
kidney disease, urinary tract infections, and pregnancy).
24. See PMC REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
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by identifying genetic mutations in a person’s DNA that make
the person more susceptible to an associated condition.25
For example, the BCR-ABL fusion gene appears in patients
with certain types of leukemia.26 Physicians most often use a
BCR-ABL genetic test to “diagnose or rule out” chronic myeloid
leukemia (CML) or Ph-positive acute lymphoblastic leukemia
(ALL).27 CML, “a slowly-progressing cancer,” comprises 15
percent of leukemias in adults.28 Ph-positive ALL, an
“aggressive form of cancer,” predominantly affects children.29 A
polymerase-chain-reaction (PCR) diagnostic test can detect one
cell expressing the BCR-ABL mutation in “105 to 106” healthy
cells, enabling physicians to diagnose CML or Ph-positive ALL
early on and improve patient prognoses.30 Significantly,
diagnosis of CML in a patient through the identification of the
BCR-ABL mutation can revolutionize her care, as treatments
that target the mutation produce fewer side effects than other
cancer treatments.31 The drug imatinib mesylate by Novartis,
for example, directly targets the BCR-ABL kinase and
“drastically improves [a CML patient’s] overall survival . . . rate
to 88% after 5 years versus 57% from nonspecific treatment with
hydroxyurea and interferon, with fewer side effects.”32
With the rise in development of precision medicine,
physicians are better equipped to diagnose and treat rare
25. See, e.g., BCR ABL Genetic Test, NAT’L LIBR. MED.: MEDLINEPLUS,
https://perma.cc/F978-BW5R (last updated Sept. 14, 2021) (describing
BCR-ABL genetic test used to identify certain types of leukemia and to
examine efficacy of cancer treatment).
26. See BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD N.C., CORPORATE MEDICAL POLICY:
BCR-ABL 1 TESTING AHSM2027 1 (July 2020) [hereinafter BCR-ABL BLUE
CROSS], https://perma.cc/2YDB-PUHX (PDF) (describing the BCR-ABL 1
mutation as resulting “from a reciprocal translocation that joins the ABL1
gene from chromosome 9 to the BCR gene on chromosome 22, . . . necessary for
the development of CML”).
27. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
28. BCR-ABL BLUE CROSS, supra note 26, at 1.
29. Id.
30. Charles L. Sawyers, Chronic Myeloid Leukemia, 340 N. ENG. J. MED.
1330, 1332 (1999).
31. Id.; see LeukemiaChronic MyeloidCML: Types of Treatment,
CANCER.NET (Mar. 2018), https://perma.cc/47EE-AAY9 (describing targeted
therapy using tyrosine kinase inhibitor drugs to treat CML, which “blocks the
growth and spread of cancer cells while limiting damage to healthy cells”).
32. BCR-ABL BLUE CROSS, supra note 26, at 2.
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conditions and diseases. Approximately 66 percent of all medical
treatment decisions are based on the results of in vitro
diagnostic testing,33 a subset of diagnostic tests used for
detection of disease and other conditions.34 Importantly, in vitro
diagnostic tests “may be used in precision medicine to identify
patients who are likely to benefit from specific treatments or
therapies.”35
The precision medicine movement reflects a growing
acknowledgement that society benefits from the development of
diagnostic tests and treatments for rare conditions and diseases
affecting fewer (but still numerous) lives36 than conditions to
which medicine has traditionally given focus.37 However, as
with drug development,38 the development of medical diagnostic
tests requires hefty up-front investment39 and firms may weigh
33. See Ulrich-Peter Rohr et al., The Value of In Vitro Diagnostic Testing
in Medical Practice: A Status Report, 11 PLOS ONE 1, 2, 11, 13 (2016),
https://perma.cc/8X8N-Z3FS (PDF) (analyzing the role of in vitro diagnostics
in healthcare worldwide).
34. See In Vitro Diagnostics, FDA, https://perma.cc/XJ7S-UMVC (last
updated Oct. 18, 2021) (“In vitro diagnostics can detect diseases or other
conditions, and can be used to monitor a person’s overall health to help cure,
treat, or prevent diseases.”).
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Soley Bayraktar & Mark Goodman, Detection of BCR-ABL
Positive Cells in an Asymptomatic Patient: A Case Report and Literature
Review, 2010 CASE REPS. MED. 1, 2 (2010) (estimating that physicians diagnose
about 4,000 new cases of CML annually in the United States); Rare Cancers,
DEP’T OF DEF., https://perma.cc/BV72-DKEL (last updated Nov. 4, 2021)
(“[A]round 200 forms of rare cancer compose around 2025% of all U.S. cancer
diagnosis, which affect more than 400,000 Americans per year.” (emphasis
added)).
37. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Siegel et al., Cancer Statistics, 2020, 70 CA:
CANCER J. FOR CLINICIANS 7, 18 (2020) (“The progress against cancer reflects
large declines in mortality for the 4 major cancers (lung, breast, prostate, and
colorectum) . . . .”).
38. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of
Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 505 (2009) (describing financial incentives,
including patent protection, that companies look for prior to developing a new
drug and noting that firms “regularly screen their drugs in R&D and discard
ones with weak patent protection”).
39. See Johnathon Liddicoat et al., The Effects of Myriad and Mayo on
Molecular-Test Development in the United States and Europe: Interviews from
the Frontline, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 785, 800 (2020) (“[D]iagnostic
executives estimate the cost to fully develop a test, including clinical
education, [to be] between $20.1 and $106 million in the United States alone.”).
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the possibility of patent protection heavily in determining
whether to move forward with R&D for a given test.40
Additionally, from the innovation standpoint, weighing the cost
of development against the commercial potential of a diagnostic
test for a rare condition or disease presents significant
challengesespecially if patent rights are unavailable.41 Recent
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit jurisprudence, however, has
dramatically affected the scope and availability of patent rights
for medical diagnostic technologies.
III. MEDICAL DIAGNOSTICS AND § 101
A.

Judicial Exclusions to § 101

Congress has defined patent eligible subject matter broadly
to comprise “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof.”42 This definition of patent eligible subject
matter remains largely unchanged from the eighteenth century,
when Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1793.43 When
assessing the bounds of this definition, the Supreme Court in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty44 noted that “[i]n choosing such
40. See Roin, supra note 38, at 505 (“Given the immense investment
needed to fund clinical trials on drugs and the ability of generic manufacturers
to rely on those tests to secure regulatory approval for their own products,
pharmaceutical companies are rarely willing to develop drugs without patent
protection.”); David O. Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 2149, 215657 (2017) [hereinafter Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility]
(discussing the “prevailing view that, because of the non-statutory exceptions
to patent eligibility, patents will not be available to protect worthy inventions,
and as a result individuals and companies may not invest efficiently in
research and development”).
41. Cf. Brief for Association of University Technology Managers as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 34, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) (No. 10-1150) (“Patent rights are
the currency of the tech transfer process, allowing early-stage research to be
moved from universities and research institutions to the private sector for
development and commercialization.”).
42. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
43. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318; see Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 30809 (1980) (describing the history of the
modern § 101, with the sole change since 1793 being the replacement of the
word “art” in the 1793 Act with the word “process” in 1952).
44. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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expansive terms . . . modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’
Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be
given wide scope.”45 Despite the statutory language, the
Supreme Court crafted several broad judicial exclusions to
§ 101. The three broad categories of patent ineligible subject
matter are “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas.”46 The Supreme Court created these exclusions to
preserve “the basic tools of scientific and technological work”47
and to ensure that patents do not impede innovation.48 Indeed,
the Mayo Court recognized “that too broad an interpretation of
this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law.”49
Some
scholars
have
critiqued
these
judicial
exclusionsparticularly the abstract ideas and natural laws
exclusionsas lacking proper definition by the Supreme
Court.50 Likewise, Professor David O. Taylor has argued that
the Supreme Court steps out of its Article III shoes and into
those of Congress when it creates patent law through judicial
exceptions to eligibility.51 Moreover, judges on the Federal
45. Id. at 308.
46. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (teaching, as well, that,
although laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot be
patented, “an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a
known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection”); see
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (stating that “mental processes[]
and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable”).
47. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
48. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S.
66, 71 (2012) (positing that “monopolization of” scientific principles “through
the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend
to promote it”).
49. See id. (reasoning that “all inventions at some level embody, use,
reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract
ideas”).
50. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI.
& TECH. L. 256, 274 (2015) (“[N]one of these terms has been clearly defined,
[so] there is likely some redundancy in the list of exclusions.”); Michael Clancy,
Note, Intellectual Property LawThe Future of Patent Eligibility Analysis on
Medical Diagnostics and Its Effects on Healthcare InnovationAriosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 12 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 319, 332 (2016)
(“The strict interpretation of section 101 may be attributable to the ambiguity
left by the failure of the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
to provide definitions of a law of nature, natural phenomena, abstract idea, or
an inventive concept.”).
51. See Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, supra note 40, at 2155 (“In
short, given the existing statutory patent law doctrines, the Court has
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Circuit have opined that other statutes adequately filter out
unpatentable technologies during examination and that the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 101 is too limiting.52 They
also attribute uncertainty in the existing doctrine to the
Supreme Court’s failure to provide enough clarity about the
boundaries of § 101.53 In light of these critiques, this Note
explores recent Supreme Court jurisprudence impacting the
boundaries of § 101 and the subsequent deterioration of patent
rights to medical diagnostic technology.54 This Note also
examines the Federal Circuit’s application of § 101 doctrine to
meritorious diagnostic patents in the face of societal and
investment interests.55
B.

Modern Era of § 101: Chipping Away at Patent Rights

1.

Bilski and the Court’s Foreshadowing of a Restrictive
§ 101 Analysis

From the Federal Circuit’s creation in 1982 until 2010, it
took an expansive view of patent eligibility, reading the judicial

identified no policy-based justification for an independent, non-statutory
patent eligibility requirement. In the process, the Court has usurped
Congress’s role of crafting statutory patentability requirements.”); see also
Ohlhausen, supra note 14, at 107 (noting patentable subject matter as an area
of rights that “the U.S. Supreme Court has recently diluted”).
52. See Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 927 F.3d
1333, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Lourie, J., concurring in the denial of the petition
for rehearing en banc)
If I could write on a clean slate, I would write as an exception to
patent eligibility, as respects natural laws, only claims directed to
the natural law itself, e.g., E=mc2, F=ma, Boyle’s Law, Maxwell’s
Equations, etc. I would not exclude uses or detection of natural
laws. The laws of anticipation, obviousness, indefiniteness, and
written description provide other filters to determine what is
patentable.
53. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (per
curiam) (Reyna, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en
banc) (“Unlike prior art for purposes of §§ 102 and 103, we have no established
parameters or guidance for what evidence we can and should consider for
inventive concept purposes [at Step Two of the Mayo/Alice test].”).
54. See infra Part III.B.
55. See infra Part IV.C.
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exceptions to § 101 narrowly.56 For example, in State Street
Bank v. Signature Financial Group,57 the Federal Circuit held
that business methods are patent eligible58 and adopted the
lenient “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test to determine
statutory patent eligibility.59 In 2008, the Federal Circuit
overruled its “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test from
State Street and adopted the machine-or-transformation test to
discern patent eligibility of a process claim.60 Under that test, a
process is “patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a
particular article into a different state or thing.”61
The first major contemporary Supreme Court case
regarding patent eligibility is Bilski v. Kappos.62 In that case,
the Court reviewed the petitioner’s claims for the “concept of
hedging risk and the application of that concept to energy
markets.”63 In the decision below, In re Bilski,64 the Federal
Circuit declared the machine-or-transformation test to be the

56. See Christopher B. Seaman & Sheena X. Wang, An Inside History of
the Burger Court’s Patent Eligibility Jurisprudence, 53 AKRON L. REV. 915, 973
(2019) (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s decisions in the 1980s and 1990s seemingly
eviscerated any meaningful limits on patent eligibility. The broad conception
of patent eligibility adopted by the Court in Chakrabarty and Diehr had
apparently won out . . . .”).
57. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
58. See id. at 137576 (rejecting a “business method exception” to patent
eligibility and holding that “[s]ince the 1952 Patent Act, business methods
have been, and should have been, subject to the same legal requirements for
patentability as applied to any other process or method”).
59. See id. at 137375 (holding patent eligible the appellant’s claims for
a machine-implemented data processing system that operated using
mathematical algorithms because the algorithms produced a “useful, concrete,
and tangible result”).
60. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959 60 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d but criticized
sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (“[W]e . . . conclude that the
‘useful, concrete and tangible result’ inquiry is inadequate and reaffirm that
the machine-or-transformation test outlined by the Supreme Court is the
proper test to apply.”).
61. Id. at 954.
62. 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
63. Id. at 609.
64. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
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“sole” test for determining patent eligibility of a process claim.65
Applying this test, the Federal Circuit rejected the patent claims
because “[p]urported transformations or manipulations simply
of public or private legal obligations or relationships, business
risks, or other such abstractions” do not tangibly “transform any
article to a different state or thing.”66
On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed the boundaries of
patent eligible subject matter for the first time in the almost
thirty years since Diamond v. Diehr.67 Affirming the ruling of
the Federal Circuit, the Court determined that the claims in the
petitioner’s application were recitations of abstract ideas rather
than patentable processes.68 Specifically, the Court noted that
risk hedging is a foundational economic concept “taught in any
introductory finance class.”69 Moreover, the Court was
concerned that allowing the petitioner to retain a patent for risk
hedging “would pre-empt use of [the] approach in all fields, and
would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”70 The
Court likewise emphasized that “limiting an abstract idea to one
field of use” does not make it patentable.71
As foreshadowed by the Federal Circuit’s ruling72 in In re
Bilski, the Court rejected the machine-or-transformation test as
“the sole test governing § 101 analyses”73 for process claims. The
Court held that the machine-or-transformation test “is a useful
and important clue, an investigative tool,” in the patent
eligibility analysis.74 In making this decision, the Court
acknowledged concerns of amici curiae regarding an expansive
65. Id. at 95556.
66. Id. at 963.
67. 450 U.S. 175 (1981); see Seaman & Wang, supra note 56, at 970
(“[T]he Supreme Court [had] retreated from the issue of patent eligibility after
Diehr for over 25 years . . . .”).
68. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 61112 (“[I]t is clear that petitioners’
application is not a patentable ‘process.’”).
69. Id. at 611 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1013 (Rader, J.,
dissenting)).
70. Id. at 612.
71. Id.
72. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 957 (recognizing “that the Supreme Court
may ultimately decide to alter or perhaps even set aside this test to
accommodate emerging technologies”).
73. Id. at 955.
74. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010).
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application of the machine-or-transformation test: “As
numerous amicus briefs argue, the machine-or-transformation
test would create uncertainty as to the patentability of software,
advanced diagnostic medical techniques,” and other advanced
technical inventions.75 Here, the Court suggested that emerging
diagnostic methods may raise “new difficulties for the patent
law.”76 However, the Court declined to state a bright-line rule
regarding subject matter eligibility under § 101.77 The “great
challenge,” stated the Court, would be in “striking the balance
between protecting inventors and not granting monopolies over
procedures that others would discover by independent, creative
application of general principles.”78
This “great challenge” about the patent eligibility of medical
diagnostic patents was foreshadowed in Laboratory Corporation
of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories.79 In that case,
the disputed claim comprised the steps of “assaying” bodily fluid
to detect homocysteine levels and “correlating” the
homocysteine levels with a vitamin B deficiency.80 At trial, the
District of Colorado held that the claim was patent eligible, and
the Federal Circuit affirmed.81
The Supreme Court granted petitioner’s writ of certiorari
but then issued a per curiam opinion dismissing the writ “as
improvidently granted.”82 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices
Stevens and Souter, dissented, arguing that the question at
issue“whether the patent claim is invalid on the ground that
it improperly seeks to ‘claim a monopoly over a basic scientific
relationship’”could have, and should have, been decided

75. Id. at 605.
76. Id. at 606.
77. See id. at 605 (“Section 101 is a ‘dynamic provision designed to
encompass new and unforeseen inventions.’ A categorical rule denying patent
protection for ‘inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress . . . would
frustrate the purposes of the patent law.’” (internal citations omitted) (quoting
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. 534 U.S. 124, 125 (2001);
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980))).
78. Id. at 606.
79. 548 U.S. 124 (2006).
80. U.S. Pat. No. 4,940,658 at col. 41, ll. 61, 63.
81. Lab’y Corp., 548 U.S. at 125 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
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then.83 Examining the purpose of the patent system itselfto
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”84Justice
Breyer’s dissent emphasized that an overly protective system
can stymy scientific progress by “impeding the free exchange of
information.”85
Excluding
fundamental
scientific
and
technological principles from patentability is “[o]ne way in
which patent law seeks to sail between [the] opposing and risky
shoals” of under-protection and overprotection.86 Justice Breyer
had “little doubt” that “[t]he correlation between homocysteine
and vitamin deficiency set forth” in the disputed claim was an
unpatentable “natural phenomenon.”87 Justice Breyer
concluded by addressing the value of deciding the case even if
his analysis regarding patentability was incorrect.88 First, the
Supreme Court’s decision “would help diminish legal
uncertainty” surrounding § 101.89 Second, the decision would
enable medical professionals to “better understand the nature of
their legal obligations” and avoid directly infringing on patents
by performing medical diagnoses or procedures disclosed
therein.90
2.

Mayo and Alice: A New Age for Diagnostic Patents

Another opportunity for the Court to address the “great
challenge”91 came in 2010. The Supreme Court granted Mayo
Collaborative Services’ first petition for writ of certiorari92 after
83. Id. at 12526.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
85. Lab’y Corp., 548 U.S. at 127 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see id.
(enumerating examples of the impediment, including “forcing researchers to
avoid the use of potentially patented ideas,” “leading them to conduct costly
and time-consuming searches of existing or pending patents,” and “raising the
costs of using the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so”).
86. Id. at 127; see id. at 128 (specifying that the exclusion “reflects a basic
judgment that protection” of “manifestations of laws of nature” would “too
often severely interfere with, or discourage, development and the further
spread of useful knowledge itself”).
87. Id. at 135.
88. Id. at 138.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 606 (2010).
92. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 561 U.S.
1040, 1040 (2010) (granting writ of certiorari).
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the Federal Circuit ruled that Prometheus Laboratories’ claims
for “calibrating the proper dosage of thiopurine drugs” for
patients with certain autoimmune diseases were patent eligible
under § 101.93 However, the Court declined the opportunity to
rule on the bounds of § 101 and instead vacated the Federal
Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case “for further
consideration in light of Bilski.”94
When the Court granted Mayo Collaborative Services’
second petition for writ of certiorari and ruled on the case in
2012, Justice Breyer penned the Court’s opinion. In Mayo,
Prometheus Laboratories brought an action against Mayo,
alleging that its technique to calibrate dosages of thiopurine
drugs infringed Prometheus’s own patented techniques.95
Specifically, the patents at issue embodied correlations between
levels of certain metabolites including 6-thioguanine, and the
likelihood that a dose of a thiopurine drug will be too high and
harm the patient, or too low and thus ineffective.96 Although the
district court found that Mayo’s technique infringed claim 7 of
Prometheus’s ’623 patent,97 the court granted summary
judgment in Mayo’s favor because it further found that the
asserted patents “recite[d] a natural phenomenon” and thus
were ineligible for patenting under § 101.98 The Federal Circuit
ultimately reversed—twice—based on its determination that
the claimed methods were patent eligible under § 101.99 The
93. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336,
1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 561 U.S. 1040
(2010).
94. Mayo, 561 U.S. at 1040.
95. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S.
66, 7576 (2012).
96. See id. at 7374 (discussing the use of thiopurine drugs to treat
Crohn’s disease and other autoimmune diseases).
97. U.S. Pat. No. 6,355,623 (2002).
98. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. CIV.
04CV1200JAHRBB, 2008 WL 878910, at *14 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d,
581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 561 U.S. 1040
(2010), rev’d, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
99. The Federal Circuit held for the second time that the disputed
treatment method claims were patent eligible because they “recite[d] a
patent-eligible application of naturally occurring correlations between
metabolite levels and efficacy or toxicity” rather than “just the correlations
themselves.” Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d
1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). Further, the court stated that

THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY

415

Federal Circuit concluded that, apart from the natural
correlations, “the claims recite[d] specific treatment steps”
involving “a particular application of the natural
correlations.”100 Likewise, the court concluded that the claimed
treatment methods “satisf[ied] the transformation prong of the
machine-or-transformation test” because they “transform[ed] an
article into a different state or thing.”101
In reviewing the case, the Court considered claim 1 of the
’623 patent as “typical” of the claims at issue and examined its
patent eligibility under § 101.102 Claim 1, “[a] method of
optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,” comprised three
steps: (1) “administering a drug” containing 6-thioguanine to the
patient, (2) “determining the level of 6-thioguanine” in the
patient, and (3) “wherein” the physician determines, based on
claimed thresholds for concentration of 6-thiopurine in the
patient’s blood, whether to increase or decrease subsequent
doses of the drug to the patient.103 Notably, as emphasized by
the Court, scientists “already understood” these correlations
“[a]t the time the discoveries embodied in the patents were
made” but without the precision set forth in the patents.104 The
Court thus inquired whether the claims “add[ed] enough to their
statements of the correlations to allow the processes they
describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply
natural laws.”105
In its analysis, the Court first identified that the claims
were directed to a “law of nature,” a judicial exclusion to § 101.106
Then, the Court analyzed the individual elements of the claimed
processes to ascertain whether they had “additional features
that provide practical assurance that the process is more than a
the
claims
“satisf[ied]
the
transformation
prong
of
the
machine-or-transformation test” under Bilski. Id. (“The transformation is of
the human body and of its components following the administration of a
specific class of drugs . . . .”).
100. Prometheus Lab’ys, 628 F.3d at 1355.
101. Id. (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
102. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 74.
103. Id. at 74–75 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623, col. 20, ll. 1025).
104. Id. at 7374.
105. Id. at 77.
106. Id.
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drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature
itself.”107 First discussing the “administering” step, the Court
stated that it simply referred to the “pre-existing audience” of
physicians that utilized thiopurine drugs to treat patients with
autoimmune disorders “long before anyone asserted [the]
claims” at issue.108 However, as the Court noted, targeting the
use of an abstract idea to a limited technological area does not
render a claim patent eligible under § 101.109
Second, the Court examined the “wherein” clauses, which
told physicians how to adjust dosages of thiopurine drugs
depending on blood levels of 6-thioguanine.110 The Court opined
that these clauses, rather than applying the natural law,
“simply tell a doctor about the relevant natural laws . . . while
trusting them to use those laws appropriately where they are
relevant to their decisionmaking.”111 Indeed, a claim that recites
a law of nature and appends an instruction to the tune of “apply
the law” is patent ineligible under § 101.112
Third, the Court assessed the “determining” step. That step
instructed physicians to determine blood levels of the relevant
thiopurine metabolite.113 However, as the Court emphasized,
the methods to measure metabolite levels in blood “were well
known in the art.”114 Scientists also “routinely measured”
metabolites when investigating the correlations claimed.115
Therefore, the step directed physicians to perform
“well-understood, routine, conventional” activities already
engaged in by others in the field.116 Such activity, as explained
107. Id.
108. Id. at 78.
109. See id. (“In any event, the ‘prohibition against patenting abstract
ideas cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to
a particular technological environment.’” (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593, 61011 (2010))).
110. Id.
111. Id. (comparing the “wherein” step to “Einstein telling linear
accelerator operators about his basic law and then trusting them to use it
where relevant;” in other words, simply telling the relevant audience to apply
a natural law).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 79.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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by the Court, “is normally not sufficient to transform an
unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of
such a law.”117
Lastly, looking at the claim holistically, the Court stated
that “the steps are not sufficient to transform unpatentable
natural correlations into patentable applications” thereof.118
Rather, taken in their sum, the claim elements “add[ed] nothing
significant beyond the sum of their parts taken separately.”119
When considering the broader issue of patent eligibility of
claims embodying a law of nature, the Court showed particular
concern “that patent law not inhibit further discovery by
improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature.”120
Likewise, the Court worried that even a diagnostic patent
claiming “limited applications” of natural laws would “threaten
to inhibit the development of more refined treatment
recommendations” combining “later discovered features of
metabolites, human physiology or individual patient
characteristics.”121 Though the Court recognized the utility of
the diagnostic patent at issue, it stepped away from determining
“whether, from a policy perspective, increased protection for
discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature is desirable.”122
Following Mayo, diagnostic patents were largely considered
unpatentable.123 Two years later in Alice Corporation v. CLS
Bank International,124 the Court clarified that Mayo applies to
all three categories of judicial exclusionsnot just to laws of
nature as discussed in Mayo.125 The Court further refined Mayo
by establishing its holding as a two-step test governing the
patent eligibility analysis under § 101. At “Step One,” a court

117. Id.
118. Id. at 80.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 85.
121. Id. at 8687.
122. Id. at 92.
123. See Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 257 (arguing that “diagnostic
applications are not patent eligible”).
124. 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
125. See id. at 217 (describing the Court’s analysis in Mayo as “a
framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts”).
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must determine whether the claims at issue are directed toward
a law of nature, abstract idea, or natural phenomenon.126 Then,
at “Step Two,” the court must examine the elements of the
claims to ascertain whether they “add enough to their
statements of” a judicial exclusion to transform the claim into a
patentable application of the otherwise patent-ineligible subject
matter.127 The Mayo/Alice test remains the controlling test for
determining patent eligible subject matter under § 101.
In Alice, the Court examined Alice Corporation’s claims
pertaining to a computerized method to mitigate “settlement
risk,” “the risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial
exchange will satisfy its obligation.”128 At trial, the district court
found that all claims were patent ineligible under § 101 as being
directed at an abstract idea.129 The Federal Circuit reversed,
but, during an en banc rehearing, the court vacated its prior
judgment and a plurality of judges affirmed the judgment of the
district court.130 The Supreme Court granted Alice’s writ of
certiorari and affirmed, utilizing the Mayo framework to guide
its analysis.
First, the Court found that the claims were directed to the
“abstract idea of intermediated settlement.”131 Like in Bilski,
126. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S.
66, 77 (2012) (“If a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is a process
reciting a law of nature . . . .”); Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (“First, we determine
whether the claims at issue are directed to . . . [a] patent-ineligible concept[].”).
127. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77 (2012); see Alice, 573 U.S. at 21718 (answering
the inquiry requires consideration of claim elements individually and
holistically to determine whether those elements sufficiently “‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 78)).
128. Alice, 573 U.S. at 213.
129. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 252, 243
(D.D.C. 2011) (finding that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of
“employing a neutral intermediary to ensure that parties to an exchange can
honor a proposed transaction”), rev’d, 685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g en
banc granted, opinion vacated, 484 F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and aff’d, 717
F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013), aff’d, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
130. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 21415 (“The plurality concluded that
petitioner’s claims ‘draw on the abstract idea of reducing settlement risk by
effecting trades through a third-party intermediary,’ and that the use of a
computer to maintain, adjust, and reconcile shadow accounts added nothing of
substance to that abstract idea.” (quoting CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty.,
717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013))).
131. Id. at 218.
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the Court emphasized that the abstract idea at issue was a
foundational economic practice that existed prior to the claims
at issue.132 Second, the Court looked at the claim elements to
determine whether it contained enough “additional features”133
to transform the abstract idea “into a patent-eligible
application.”134 At Step Two, the Court stressed that “the mere
recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention”
and likened such a recitation to “[s]tating an abstract idea while
adding the words ‘apply it with a computer.’”135 Ultimately,
following consideration of the claim elements individually and
holistically, all claims at issuemethod, system, and media
claimswere held patent ineligible under this principle.136
Following Mayo and Alice, some practitioners and scholars
asserted that medical diagnostics were no longer patentable.137
C.

Mayo/Alice Aftermath: Questionable Patent Eligibility for
Diagnostics

The Court in Mayo pointed out that “all inventions at some
level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature,
natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”138 This statement
applies with special force to medical diagnostic technologies,
which may depend on utilizing a correlation found in nature. For
example, the correlation between presence of a specific gene
mutation and the likelihood of future cancer139 or between levels
132. See id. at 21920 (comparing intermediated settlement to the risk
hedging in Bilski).
133. Id. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 223.
136. See id. at 22527 (finding that the claims “add[ed] nothing of
substance to the underlying abstract idea”).
137. See Gene Quinn, It May Be Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit,
IPWATCHDOG (July 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/52ED-RJFQ (“It would be easy
to distinguish both Mayo and Alice, but rather than recognize the peculiar
facts of these cases as representing the most trivial of innovations, the Federal
Circuit has used Mayo to destroy medical diagnostics . . . .”).
138. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71
(2012).
139. See supra notes 2630 (discussing testing for BCR-ABL fusion gene
mutation to diagnose certain types of leukemia); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 57983, 595 (2013) (holding that the
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of certain metabolites or enzymes in a patient’s body and other
conditions.140 Because such naturally occurring correlations
may be necessary per se in the development of diagnostics, Mayo
injected significant uncertainty into decisions of claim drafting
and whether to pursue a diagnostic patent in the first place.141
However, evidence from practitioners, companies, and
technology transfer officers intent on patenting new diagnostic
technologies demonstrates that molecular diagnostic tests are
still patent eligible in the United States following Mayoat
least, according to the standards of the USPTO.142 A different
story emerges when those patents are subject to judicial review.
When establishing the Mayo test as governing all judicial
exclusions to § 101, the Alice Court recognized that it must
“tread carefully in construing . . . exclusionary principle[s] lest
[they] swallow all of patent law.”143 However, as evidenced by
subsequent Federal Circuit cases, the Mayo/Alice framework
operates restrictively when applied to diagnostic patents.144
isolated locations and sequences of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes on
chromosomes 13 and 17, “mutations of which can substantially increase the
risks of breast and ovarian cancer,” were patent ineligible under § 101).
140. See, e.g., Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC,
760 F. App’x 1013, 1015, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (discussing method claims for
a diagnostic test utilizing the correlation between levels of the blood
myeloperixodase enzyme and havingor developingcertain cardiovascular
diseases, ultimately finding the claims ineligible under § 101 as “us[ing] a
known technique in a standard way to observe a natural law”).
141. See Liddicoat et al., supra note 39, at 82829 (2020)
Uncertainty was a recurrent theme in interviews when discussing
Mayo. Respondents raised three issues in particular: (i) whether
claims could be drafted that were Mayo-compliant (and valuable);
(ii) how USPTO examiners would apply Mayo to a patent
application; and (iii) whether granted papers would survive judicial
review, a concern which also applied to patents granted before the
decision.
142. See id. at 828 (arguing that interview data from companies,
technology transfer offices, and patent practitioners in the United States and
Europe demonstrates that molecular diagnostic tests are still patent eligible
in the United States following Mayo as “many interviewees described a variety
of ways to draft valuable claims”).
143. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014).
144. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 927 F.3d 1333,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (Moore, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc) (“Since Mayo, we have held every single diagnostic claim
in every case before us ineligible.”); see id. at 1354 (“We have turned Mayo into
a per se rule that diagnostic kits and techniques are ineligible. That per se rule
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1. The Federal Circuit Begrudgingly Declares Patent
Ineligible Diagnostic Methods in Ariosa and Athena
In Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,145 the Federal
Circuit examined claims of Sequenom’s ’540 patent,146 which
taught methods for non-invasive prenatal testing to diagnose
“certain fetal characteristics based on the detection of paternally
inherited cffDNA.”147 Following a letter from Sequenom
threatening to bring an action for infringing the ’540 patent,
Ariosa Diagnostics filed a declaratory action alleging
non-infringement.148 In denying Sequenom’s motion to
“preliminarily enjoin Ariosa from selling the accused Harmony
Prenatal Test,” the district court found that “there was a
substantial question over whether the subject matter of the
asserted claims” was patent eligible under § 101.149 Sequenom
appealed to the Federal Circuit, which vacated and remanded
the case “for the district court to examine subject matter
eligibility . . . in light of”150 Association for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad.151
On remand, the district court held that the asserted claims
were patent ineligible under § 101 as being “directed to the
is ‘too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle [which] could
eviscerate patent law.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71) (alteration in original)).
145. 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
146. U.S. Pat. No. 6,258,540 (2001).
147. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1373.
148. Id. at 1374 (describing the infringement action). Sequenom
counterclaimed alleging that Ariosa’s Harmony Test infringed the ‘540 patent.
Id.
149. Id. at 1374.
150. Id. at 1374–75 (quoting Aria Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 726
F.3d 1296, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
151. 569 U.S. 576 (2013). In Myriad, the Court examined patents for the
location and sequence of mutations of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in a
person’s DNA. See id. at 58384 (describing the disputed claims). The Court
found the disputed claims patent ineligible, narrowly holding that “genes and
the information they encode are not patent eligible under § 101 simply because
they have been isolated from the surrounding genetic material.” Id. at 58994,
596. Unlike Mayo, Myriad did not implicate method claims and does not
encompass a large swathe of medical diagnostics. See id. at 595 (discussing the
limitations to the Court’s holding); Christopher M. Holman, Mayo, Myriad,
and the Future of Innovation in Molecular Diagnostics and Personalized
Medicine, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 639, 64761 (2014) (arguing that, unlike Mayo,
Myriad will not heavily impact the patenting of medical diagnostics).

422

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397 (2022)

natural phenomenon of paternally inherited cffDNA” rather
than to an application of that phenomenon.152 Sequenom
appealed the ruling, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.153
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit examined three
independent claims of the ’540 patent. Claim 1, a method to
detect paternally-inherited nucleic acids in maternal plasma or
serum, comprised two steps: (1) “amplifying a paternally
inherited nucleic acid” from a maternal serum or plasma
sample, and (2) “detecting the presence of a paternally inherited
nucleic acid of fetal origin in the sample.”154 Claim 24, a method
to detect paternally inherited nucleic acids in a maternal blood
sample, comprised three steps: (1) “removing” specified “cell
populations from the blood sample,” (2) “amplifying a paternally
inherited nucleic acid from the remaining fluid,” and (3)
“subjecting the amplified nucleic acid” to tests to detect the
paternally inherited nucleic acids.155 Lastly, claim 25, a method
“for performing a prenatal diagnosis on a maternal blood
sample,” comprised three steps: (a) “obtaining a non-cellular
fraction of the blood sample,” (b) “amplifying a paternally
inherited nucleic acid” from that sample, and (c) “performing
nucleic acid analysis on the amplified nucleic acid to detect
paternally inherited fetal nucleic acid.”156 The court collectively
analyzed the patent-eligibility of the three claims and utilized
the Mayo/Alice framework to guide its analysis.
First, the court asked “whether the claims at issue [were]
directed to a patent-ineligible concept.”157 The claims each
comprised multiple steps, starting with cffDNA158 sourced from
“a sample of maternal plasma or serum.”159 Notably, the location
of cffDNA “existed in nature” before its precise discovery by the

152. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1375.
153. Id. at 1376–77.
154. U.S. Pat. No. 6,258,540, at col. 23, ll. 6167.
155. Id. at col. 26, ll. 2028.
156. Id. at col. 26, ll. 2936.
157. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
158. cffDNA is “a naturally occurring non-cellular fetal DNA that
circulates freely in the blood stream of a pregnant woman.” Id. at 1376.
159. Id.
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inventors of the ’540 patent.160 The court also stressed that the
methods ended with a natural phenomenonpaternally
inherited cffDNA.161 Thus, the claims were directed to a natural
phenomenon.162
Turning to Step Two, the court examined the elements of
the method claims “to determine whether the claim contains an
inventive concept sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed naturally
occurring phenomenon into a patent eligible application.”163
Mayo alternatively labeled the search as one for “additional
features” within the claims to achieve the transformation.164
“For [method] claims that encompass natural phenomen[a],” the
Federal Circuit stated that the “steps [of the method] are the
additional features that must be new and useful.”165 The court
focused on the “amplifying” and detection steps present in each
of the claims at issue.
Comparing Sequenom’s claims to those at issue in Mayo,
the court articulated that, like in Mayo, the claims instructed
physicians to conduct “routine, conventional techniques” at each
step.166 Specifically, “[u]sing methods like PCR to amplify and
detect cffDNA [were] well-understood, routine, and conventional
activity” at the time the application for the ’540 patent was
filed.167 Drawing further from the ’540 patent’s specification and
from expert testimony, the court concluded that the methods at
issue “amount[ed] to a general instruction to doctors to apply
routine, conventional techniques when seeking to detect

160. Id. (“It is undisputed that the existence of cffDNA in maternal blood
is a natural phenomenon.”).
161. See id. (stating that Sequenom did not argue that the inventors
“created or altered any of the genetic information encoded in the cffDNA”).
162. See id. (emphasizing the finding that the methods “begin[] and end[]
with a natural phenomenon,” and noting further support for the finding in the
patent’s written description).
163. Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012)).
164. Id. at 1377 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.; see id. at 1378 (providing excerpts from the specification of the
‘540 patent, the patent’s prosecution history, expert testimony, and testimony
of the inventors).

424

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397 (2022)

cffDNA,” and were thus “not new and useful.”168 Therefore, the
court held that the claims at issue were patent ineligible.169
Judge Linn concurred in the court’s judgment, albeit with a
distinct qualifier and critique of Mayo:
I join the court’s opinion invalidating the claims of the ’540
patent only because I am bound by the sweeping language of
the test set out in [Mayo]. In my view, the breadth of the
second part of the test was unnecessary to the decision
reached
in
Mayo.
This
case
represents
the
consequenceperhaps unintendedof that broad language
in excluding a meritorious invention from the patent
protection it deserves and should have been entitled to
retain.170

Judge Linn highlighted the evident frustration at the
Federal Circuit following that case. Moreover, Judge Linn
specifically called out the Mayo Court’s “blanket dismissal of
conventional post-solution steps” as “leav[ing] no room to
distinguish Mayo from [Ariosa],” despite significant factual
differences between the “conventional” steps required to
perform the methods of the asserted claims.171 In Mayo, the
Court noted that physicians understood and utilized the
scientific correlations embodied in Prometheus’s patents long
before the patent was granted, and likewise routinely measured
blood levels of metabolites to investigate the claimed
correlations.172 By contrast, Judge Linn stressed that “no one
was amplifying and detecting paternally-inherited cffDNA
using the plasma or serum of pregnant mothers.”173 Rather, “the
maternal plasma used to
be routinely discarded
because . . . nobody thought that fetal cell-free DNA would be
present.”174 To that same point, Judge Linn also emphasized the
merits of Sequenom’s invention and advances over prior
artasserting that Sequenom’s ’540 patent taught a new
168. Id. at 1377.
169. See id. at 1378 (“The claims of the ’540 patent at issue in this appeal
are not directed to patent eligible subject matter and are, therefore, invalid.”).
170. Id. at 1380 (Linn, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 1381.
172. See supra notes 108116 and accompanying text.
173. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (Linn, J., concurring).
174. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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method175 rather than “appending conventional steps” to an
existing method.176
Four years later in Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo
Collaborative Services,177 the Federal Circuit examined claims
of Athena’s ’820 patent,178 which taught a method of diagnosing
certain neurological disorders, including a rare form of
Myasthenia Gravis (MG) through detection of antibodies to the
muscle-specific tyrosine kinase (MuSK) protein.179 Prior to the
’820 patent’s inventors’ discoveries of the association between
MG and MuSK autoantibodies, “no disease had been associated
with MuSK.”180 Athena developed and marketed a test called
FMUSK to diagnose MuSK-related neurological disorders.181
When Athena discovered that Mayo “developed two competing
tests,” Athena brought an infringement action against Mayo.182
Mayo moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the patent
effectively “patent[ed] a law of nature” and that “it use[d]
techniques standard in the art.”183 The district court granted
that motion, finding that the claims were directed to ineligible
subject matter.184 On appeal, the Federal Circuit examined

175. See id. (highlighting that prior methods for prenatal diagnoses
“required invasive methods,” were less accurate, and presented greater risks
than the claimed method).
176. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 82
(2012).
177. 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 855 (2020).
178. U.S. Pat. No. 7,267,820 (2007).
179. See Athena, 915 F.3d at 74647 (discussing the discovery that, while
“80% of patients with MG produce acetylcholine receptors autoantibodies,”
some of the other 20 percent which do not produce those autoantibodies
“instead generate autoantibodies to a membrane protein called MuSK”).
180. Id. at 747 (citing U.S. Pat. No. 7,267,820 at col. 2, ll. 3537).
181. Id. at 74647.
182. Id. at 746.
183. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 275 F. Supp.
3d 306, 308 (D. Mass. 2017), aff’d, 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
184. See Athena Diagnostics, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 31113 (granting Mayo’s
motion to dismiss after finding that the claims were directed to a natural law
and that the claims lacked an “inventive concept” so as to make the claims
patent eligible under § 101 (quoting Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 572 U.S.
208, 218 (2014))).
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whether dependent claims 69 were patent eligible under
§ 101.185
The court analyzed claims 79, then briefly discussed claim
6 as “Athena did not present any arguments specific to” that
claim.186 The court homed in on claim 9 as representative of the
claims at issue, summarizing it as comprising: “(1) contacting
MuSK or an epitope thereof having a 125I label, with bodily
fluid; (2) immunoprecipitating any antibody/MuSK complex;
and (3) monitoring for the label on the complex, wherein the
presence of the label indicates the presence of a MuSK-related
disorder.”187 The court noted that “[i]t is undisputed that
iodination and immunoprecipitation were known techniques at
the time of the invention.”188 Likewise, techniques to perform
autoantibody detection, including radioimmunoassays as
utilized in the claimed methods, were “known per se in the
art.”189
Examining the claims under the Mayo/Alice framework, the
court first assessed whether the claims were “directed to a law
of nature.”190 Whereas Athena contended that the claims were
“directed to a new laboratory technique,” Mayo argued that the
claims were instead “directed to a natural law: the correlation
between naturally-occurring MuSK autoantibodies and
MuSK-related neurological diseases.”191 Ultimately, the court
agreed with Mayo’s interpretation of the asserted claims,
finding that there could “be no dispute that [the correlation] is
an ineligible natural law” because it “exists in nature apart from
any human action.”192 Addressing Athena’s arguments, the
court stated that, rather than “harness[ing] a natural law to
produce a technological improvement,” claims 79 were

185. See Athena, 915 F.3d 743, 747 (focusing on claim 9, “the most specific
one at issue”).
186. Id. at 748. Accordingly, this section focuses on the court’s analysis of
claims 79. For the text of claims 79, see U.S. Pat. No. 7,267,820 col. 12, l.
62col. 13, l. 5 (claim 7); id. col. 13, ll. 67 (claim 8); id. col. 13, ll. 89 (claim
9).
187. Athena, 915 F.3d at 747.
188. Id. at 748.
189. Id. (quoting U.S. Pat. No. 7,267,820 col. 3, l. 35)).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 750.
192. Id.
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“directed to a natural law because the claimed advance was only
in the discovery of a natural law, and that the additional recited
steps only apply conventional techniques to detect that natural
law.”193 Although the court acknowledged that the claims also
involved “certain concrete steps to observe its operation,”194 the
court rejected Athena’s contention that the claims were directed
to an “innovative laboratory technique”195 because the steps
were not “meaningful non-routine steps.”196
Having concluded that claims 79 were directed to a
natural law, the court turned to Step Two. At Step Two, the
court examined the elements of the claims individually and
holistically “to determine whether the additional elements
‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent eligible
application.”197 In line with its discussion at Step One, the court
held that “the claims fail[ed] to provide an inventive concept”
because
“the
specification
defines
the
individual
immunoprecipitation and iodination steps and the overall
radioimmunoassay as conventional techniques.”198 Discussing
Athena’s argument that “the claimed steps were unconventional
because they had not been applied to detect MuSK
autoantibodies prior to [the] discovery of the correlation
between MuSK autoantibodies and MG,” the court stated that it
“cannot hold that performing standard techniques in a standard

193. Id. at 751 (likening the claims at issue to those in Ariosa).
194. Id.
195. Id.; see id. at 75052 (distinguishing the claims at issue from those in
Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., which recited a new,
patent eligible method of producing preserved hepatocyte cells for subsequent
use rather than “an observation or detection of the ability of hepatocytes to
survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles” (quoting Rapid Litig. Mgmt., Ltd. v.
CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2016))).
196. Id. at 751 (quoting Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health
Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017)); see id. at 75152
(comparing the claims at issue to those in Cleveland Clinic, wherein the
Federal Circuit found patent ineligible under § 101 claims that “recited
detecting [myeloperoxidase (MPO)] or other MPO-related products in a patient
sample and then predicting a patient’s risk of having or developing
cardiovascular disease”).
197. Athena, 915 F.3d at 753 (quoting Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 572
U.S. 208, 217 (2014)).
198. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 915 F.3d 743,
754 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 855 (2020).
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way to observe a newly discovered natural law provides an
inventive concept” as required by Mayo.199
Notably, though the court rejected all of Athena’s
arguments for eligibility, it acknowledged the validity of the
policy positions taken by the dissent and opined that under
Mayo and Federal Circuit precedent it could not rule in any
other direction:
The dissent states much that one can agree with from the
standpoint of policy, and history, including that “the public
interest is poorly served by adding disincentive to the
development of new diagnostic methods.” We would add
further that, in our view, providing patent protection to novel
and non-obvious diagnostic methods would promote the
progress of science and useful arts. But, whether or not we
as individual judges might agree or not that these claims
only recite a natural law, . . . [Supreme Court] precedent
leaves no room for a different outcome here.200

Judge
Newman
dissented
from
the
judgment,
demonstrating thateven five years laterapplying the
Mayo/Alice framework to diagnostic technologies remained
highly contentious.201 In particular, Athena highlights how the
Federal Circuit, rather than heeding the Supreme Court’s
instruction to apply the exclusions to § 101 cautiously,202 has
further constrained the Mayo/Alice framework.203 For instance,
though the court in Athena stated that “[t]he step one ‘directed
to’ inquiry focuses on the claim as a whole,” part of the court’s
rationale for concluding that the asserted claims were directed
to a natural law was because “the additional recited steps [in
the claims] only apply conventional techniques to detect that
199. Id.
200. Id. at 753 n.4 (internal citations omitted).
201. Id. at 757 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“This court’s decisions on the
patent-ineligibility of diagnostic methods are not consistent, and my
colleagues today enlarge the inconsistencies and exacerbate the judge-made
disincentives to development of new diagnostic methods, with no public
benefit.”).
202. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S.
66, 71 (2012) (“[T]oo broad an interpretation of [judicial exclusions to § 101]
could eviscerate patent law.”).
203. See Athena, 915 F.3d at 757 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The court
again departs from the cautious restraints in the Supreme Court’s Mayo/Alice
application of laws of nature and abstract ideas.”).
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natural law.”204 Here, the court arguably inserted Step Two
requirements into its analysis at Step One.205
Likewise, Judge Newman argued in her dissent that, in
breaking down the asserted claims but not considering all of
their limitations and elements, the court departed from
Supreme Court precedent regarding claim interpretation.206
Specifically, the Federal Circuit erred at Step One when it
ignored significant “chemical and biological steps” taught by the
claims that were not known or standard in the art207 and instead
“excise[d] from the claims . . . steps performed by conventional
procedures.”208 Only as a whole did the claims enable physicians
to diagnose MG: the inventors claimed “a new multi-step
diagnostic method . . . a man-made reaction sequence
employing new components in a new combination to perform a
new diagnostic procedure.”209
Judge Newman also acknowledged concerns of many amici
curiaefrom life sciences organizations to groups of law
professorsthat
inconsistency
in
judge-made
law
210
In
disincentivizes the development of diagnostic methods.
204. Id. at 750, 751.
205. See id. at 761 (Newman, J., dissenting)
The majority does not distinguish between the question of whether
the claimed method as a whole is eligible, and the question of
whether the separate steps use conventional procedures. Instead,
my colleagues hold that since the separate procedures are
conventional, it is irrelevant that the method as a whole is a new
method.
206. See id. at 758 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“In determining the eligibility
of respondents’ claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims
must be considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into
old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in
the analysis.” (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981))).
207. Id. at 758; see id. (“The reaction between the antibody and the MuSK
protein was not previously known, nor was it known to form a labeled MuSK
or its epitope, nor to form the antibody/MuSK complex, immunoprecipitate the
complex, and monitor for radioactivity, thereby diagnosing these previously
undiagnosable neurotransmission disorders.”).
208. Id. at 75859.
209. Id. at 759.
210. See id. at 76263 (discussing disincentives to innovation brought
about by “unabated uncertainty about the patent-eligibility of many
biotechnological inventions, with diagnostic and prognostic methods being
particularly affected” (quoting Brief for Biotechnology Innovation
Organization et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 2, Athena
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that situation, Judge Newman asserted, “[t]he loser is the
afflicted public, for diagnostic methods that are not developed
benefit no one.”211
2.

Following Ariosa and Athena, Judges Ask for Reform of
§ 101

Following the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Ariosa and
Athena, the patentees in both cases petitioned for rehearing en
banc. In both instancesfour years apartthe Federal Circuit
denied the petition,212 albeit with individual judges remarking
that the decision was required by Mayo.
The varying concurring and dissenting opinions
accompanying the denials of en banc rehearing in both
casesespecially considering Judge Linn’s concurring opinion
in Ariosa and Judge Newman’s dissent in Athenasuggest the
need for reform of § 101, particularly regarding diagnostic
technologies.213 For instance, in his opinion concurring in the
denial of Athena’s petition for rehearing en banc, Judge Hughes
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., Inc., 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir.
2019) (No. 2017-2508), 2019 WL 189542)).
211. Id. at 763.
212. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1284
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (denying Sequenom’s petition); Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Mayo Collaborative Servs., Inc., 927 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (denying
Athena’s petition).
213. See Ariosa, 809 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Lourie, J.,
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc)
In sum, it is unsound to have a rule that takes inventions of this
nature out of the realm of patent-eligibility on grounds that they
only claim a natural phenomenon plus conventional steps, or that
they claim abstract concepts. But I agree that the panel did not err
in its conclusion that under Supreme Court precedent it had no
option other than to affirm the district court.
id. at 1287 (Dyk, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc)
In my view the framework of Mayo and Alice is an essential
ingredient of a healthy patent system, allowing the invalidation of
improperly issued and highly anticompetitive patents without the
need for protracted and expensive litigation. Yet I share the
concerns of some of my colleagues that a too restrictive test for
patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 with respect to laws of
nature (reflected in some of the language in Mayo) may discourage
development and disclosure of new diagnostic and therapeutic
methods in the life sciences, which are often driven by discovery of
new natural laws and phenomena.
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expressed that “the bottom line for diagnostics patents is
problematic” and invited the Supreme Court or Congress to
issue “further explication of eligibility standards in the area of
diagnostics patents.”214 Likewise, Judge Moore, dissenting from
the denial for rehearing en banc of Athena, went as far as to
discourage patentholders for medical diagnostic methods from
“wast[ing] resources with additional en banc requests” if the
Federal Circuit declares their claims patent-ineligible.215 The
“only hope” to ensure patent eligibility of medical diagnostic
claims “lies with the Supreme Court or Congress.”216 Part VII
further discusses the importance of the Federal Circuit’s calls
for reconsideration of the scope of § 101 in view of the findings
of the empirical study discussed in Part VI.
D.

What Diagnostics Survive? And How?

As the Supreme Court has indicated, and the Federal
Circuit affirmed in recent cases, diagnostic methods are largely
unpatentable. By contrast, if an inventor creates a new device to
perform a medical diagnostic test, the device is arguably
patentable,217 even if the underlying biological relationship
examined relates to a patent ineligible natural phenomenon or
abstract idea.218 Likewise, Judge Lourie, concurring in the
214. Athena, 927 F.3d at 1337 (Hughes, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc).
215. Id. at 1363 (Moore, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc).
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., 955 F.3d 1358, 136871
(Fed. Cir. 2020) (finding that the petitioner’s patent was “directed to an
improved cardiac monitoring device and not to an abstract idea,” especially
emphasizing the technological and methodological improvements of the device
over prior art); cf Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566
U.S. 66, 73 (2012) (holding that the process claims at issue did not satisfy § 101
and noting “[i]n particular, the steps . . . (apart from the natural laws
themselves) involve[d] well-understood, routine, conventional activity
previously engaged in by researchers in the field”).
218. Under the Mayo/Alice framework, such a device would be patentable
at Step 2 provided that the elements of the claim “‘transform the nature of the
claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 217 (2014) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78); see Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 595 (2013) (“Had Myriad
created an innovative method of manipulating genes while searching for the
[non-patentable] BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, it could possibly have sought a
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denial of en banc rehearing of Athena, suggested that an
“unconventional combination of steps to detect the natural law”
may be patentable.219 “[U]nconventional arrangements of
known laboratory techniques, even if directed to a natural law,”
also escape Mayo’s prohibition.220 Additionally, though
non-binding,221 the USPTO’s subject matter eligibility guidance
provides that claims for specific methods of detecting a
biomarker may be patent eligible if the detection is performed
via non-routine, unconventional steps.222
Conversely, the Mayo Court instructed that “simply
appending conventional steps . . . to laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot make those laws,
phenomena, and ideas patentable.”223 This latter scenario raises
concerns about physicians’ ability to treat their patients without
unknowingly infringing patented diagnostic methods.224 The
contrary argument insists that limiting the scope of patent
coverage in the areas of scientific correlations “will interfere
method patent. But the processes used by Myriad to isolate DNA were well
understood by the geneticists at the time of Myriad’s patents . . . .”).
219. Athena, 927 F.3d at 1336 (Lourie, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc).
220. Id. (citing Rapid Litig. Mgmt., Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042,
1051 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
221. See Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics, LLC, 760 F.
App’x 1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“While we greatly respect the PTO’s
expertise on all matters relating to patentability, including patent eligibility,
we are not bound by its guidance.”).
222. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY
EXAMPLES: LIFE SCIENCES 2628 (2016), https://perma.cc/T9HB-AJHM (PDF)
(providing patent eligible examples of diagnostic method claims based on
Myriad’s BRCA1 discovery and distinguishing them from methods utilizing
“routine or conventional techniques”).
223. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 82.
224. See id. at 91 (enumerating concerns of some amici that allowing
claims to scientific correlations concerning the body to survive scrutiny would
result in “a vast thicket of exclusive rights over the use of critical scientific
data that must remain widely available if physicians are to provide sound
medical care” (quoting Brief for American College of Medical Genetics et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) (No. 10-1150))); see Brief for
American College of Medical Genetics et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 7, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S.
66 (2012) (No. 10-1150) (“If these patents remain in force, any physician who
measures those metabolite levels and knows about the observed correlations
will unavoidably become an infringer.”).
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significantly with the ability of medical researchers to make
valuable discoveries, particularly in the area of diagnostic
Likewiseas
examined
later
in
this
research.”225
Noteopponents of a more limited interpretation of § 101 argue
that such interpretation will stifle innovation and lead to
diminished investment in expensive research that may
otherwise produce discovery of important scientific correlations
and laws of nature.226
IV. PERSPECTIVES REGARDING VENTURE CAPITAL, PATENTS,
AND INNOVATION
Although patent rights incentivize innovation, inventors
typically need outside funding to help commercialize their
inventions and bring them to market.227 One form of funding is
through venture capital (VC).228 VC firms and the National
Venture Capital Association (NVCA) argue that strong patent
protection for technologies such as medical diagnostics
mitigates the risk of investing in the development of those same
technologies.229 This Note examines the effect of Bilski and
Mayo on levels of VC investment in diagnostic technologies. But
before delving into analysis of VC investment data, it is
necessary to provide some context about VC firms, motivation
for investment, and the connection between R&D, investment,
and patent rights.

225. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 91.
226. See id. (summarizing Prometheus’ argument that medical research,
“which includes research leading to the discovery of laws of nature, is
expensive,” important for the United States to maintain its status as a world
leader in diagnostic research, and thus “requires protection”).
227. See What Is Venture Capital?, NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N,
https://perma.cc/9AAX-RHPZ (“Venture capital has enabled the United States
to support its entrepreneurial talent by turning ideas and basic research into
products and services that have transformed the world.”).
228. See id. (“Venture capital firms are professional, institutional
managers of risk capital that enable and support the most innovative and
promising companies.”).
229. See, e.g., NVCA Brief, supra note 17, at 910 (“[I]n biotechnology,
strong patent protection correlates with the amount of R&D investments made
by companies, and weak patent laws engender poor investment in R&D,
diminishing a company’s probability of success.”).
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A.

1.

Venture Capital Firms

Private Investment: Distinct Motivation from Federal
Investment

Private investors’ motivations to invest in R&D differ from
the federal government’s motivations. Notably, “[t]he federal
government is the nation’s largest supporter of basic
research.”230 As compared to private investment, federal
investment in R&D is motivated by societal benefit and the idea
that “the private sector will, left on its own, underinvest in basic
research from a societal perspective.”231 This Note focuses on VC
investment in medical diagnostic technologies because societal
benefit is at best a secondary consideration for VC firms in
picking their investments.232
The federal government supports niche, innovative medical
research through robust grants in the utilitarian interest of
improving and saving lives.233 The National Institutes of Health,
for example, “is the largest public funder of biomedical research
in the world, investing more than $32 billion a year to enhance
life, and reduce illness and disability.”234 By contrast, private
investors place primary focus on creating economic value.235

230. JOHN F. SARGENT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45715,
AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) FUNDING: FY2020 6 (2020).

FEDERAL RESEARCH

231. Id.
232. Before addressing the societal impact of eliminating patent eligibility
for scientific correlations, the National Venture Capital Association in its
amicus curiae brief in Mayo opined about the negative effect of such a decision
on investments made in reliance on patent eligibility of those correlations. See
NVCA Brief, supra note 17, at 3 (“Removing patent eligibility for diagnostic
correlations . . . jeopardizes the billions of dollars venture firms have already
invested in personalized medicine companies in reliance on patent
protection.”).
233. See About Grants, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, https://perma.cc/T8T4-WXVJ
(last updated Mar. 17, 2017) (“NIH funded research has led to breakthroughs
and new treatments, helping people live longer, healthier lives, and building
the research foundation that drives discovery.”).
234. Id.
235. See SARGENT, supra note 230, at 6 (“The usual argument for this view
is that the social returns (i.e., the benefits to society at large) exceed the
private returns (i.e., the benefits accruing to the private investor, such as
increased revenues or higher stock value).”).
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Cautious Investors

VC firms play a critical role in financing start-up
companies, especially in the biotechnology industry.236 VC firms
invest in companies hoping for rapid high growth and will seek
to liquidate investments if they are not sufficiently profitable
over a short period of time.237 In other words, prior to investing,
venture capitalists “plan for exit.”238 When examining potential
investment or acquisition targets, venture capitalists view
patent protection of a company’s intellectual assets as indicative
of competent management,239 of the ability of the company to
survive in a competitive market,240 and of enhanced
profitability.241 On the other hand, venture capitalists will
refrain from investing in start-up companies whose work is
subject to patent demands from patent assertion entities (i.e.,
“patent trolls”).242 Therefore, for a venture capitalist to consider
investing in a start-up company, the company’s R&D endeavors
236. See Healthcare Innovation, NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N,
https://perma.cc/9955-RAKG (archived Jan. 27, 2021) (“For over three decades,
venture capital has spurred the creation and growth of healthcare innovation,
such as in the biotechnology and medical device industries. . . . For example,
venture capital backed 42% of all FDA-approved drugs from 20092018.”).
237. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 50 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(explaining theory of VC investment in emerging companies, including the
motivation to invest: “VCs seek very high rates of return, usually a ten-fold
return of capital over a five year period”).
238. D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 315, 316 (2005); see id. (“The ability to control exit is crucial to the venture
capitalist’s business model of short-term funding of nascent business
opportunities. Exit allows venture capitalists to reallocate funds and the
nonfinancial contributions that accompany them to early stage companies.”).
239. See Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital,
and Software Start-ups, 36 RSCH. POL’Y 193, 200 (2007) (noting that this
assertion likewise holds for a start-up company’s “prospect of patents”).
240. See id. (“Most obviously, patents can solve one of the most difficult
problems for a startup: convincing the venture capitalist that the startup can
sustainably differentiate itself from its competitors.”).
241. See Graham & Sichelman, supra note 6, at 1078 (“[P]atents . . . are
indicators of a company’s ability to maintain supernormal profits or to reduce
licensing costs.”).
242. See Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Start-up Companies: The
View from the Venture Capital Community, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236, 243
(2014) (“When companies spend money protecting their intellectual property
position, they are not expanding; and when companies spend time thinking
about patent demands, they are not inventing.”).
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should not only have the potential for patent protection, but also
be distinct enough from existing innovation so as not to expose
the venture capitalist to losses due to settlement or litigation of
patent infringement claims.243
Moreover, a significant correlation exists between
patenting activity of a start-up and “various proxies for strong
performance: rounds of financing, total investment, exit status,
reaching a late stage of financing, and longevity.”244 Researchers
have also found that start-ups with early patent activity achieve
“much higher rates of VC funding overall” in comparison with
start-ups having lower or no patent activity.245 Because VC
firms invest so cautiously and with eyes toward exit, it follows
that current § 101 jurisprudence may cause VC investors to
hesitate in investing in companies developing medical
diagnostics technologies thatas of Mayo and its
progenyappear to be patent-ineligible. Decreased investment
would be concerning from a societal perspective, as “[s]mall
venture-backed companies play a critical role in bringing
revolutionary
medical
innovations
and
discovering
groundbreaking treatments and cures aimed at diagnosing,
treating, and curing the most deadly and costly diseases.”246
Accordingly, the next section explores in greater detail the
effects of uncertainty on investment in innovation.
B.

Investment in R&D/Innovation and Patents

1.

Investment Uncertainty and Patent Rights

Some studies have indicated that greater market
uncertainty tends to reduce R&D investment.247 For instance, in

243. See id. at 243 (finding, through an empirical study of VC investment
behavior with respect to start-up companies, that “100% of venture capitalists
indicate that if a company had an existing patent demand against it, they
might refrain from investing”).
244. Mann & Sager, supra note 239, at 206.
245. Ufuk Akcigit et al., Synergizing Ventures 9 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of
Atlanta, Working Paper 2019-17, 2019), https://perma.cc/KW2H-FEZE.
246. Healthcare Innovation, supra note 236.
247. See Dirk Czarnitzki & Andrew A. Toole, Patent Protection, Market
Uncertainty, and R&D Investment, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 147, 157 (2011)
(“Our results show that higher levels of uncertainty reduce current R&D
investment . . . .”); Andrew B. Abel et al., Options, the Value of Capital, and
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a 2011 empirical study about patent protection, R&D
investment, and market uncertainty, Czarnitzki and Toole
found that patent protection tends to mitigate firms’
uncertainty, thereby leading to greater R&D investment.248
Czarnitzki and Toole further found that “patent protection does
not mitigate the effect of uncertainty in industries where
patents are ineffective.”249 Patents are highly effective tools in
the biotechnology industry as firms will heavily weigh the
probability of obtaining patent protection when deciding
whether to invest in developing a new drug or treatment.250
2.

§ 101, Innovation, and Investment in R&D

Uncertainty in how to apply § 101 creates problems for the
economic facets of patent law.251 Scholars argue that
uncertainty in the scope of patent eligible subject matter poses
problems for companies who wish to capitalize on the economic
incentives of obtaining a patent for valuable technology.252
Investment, 111 Q.J. ECON. 753, 754, 776 (1996) (correlating greater
uncertainty with lower incentives for investment).
248. See Czarnitzki & Toole, supra note 247, at 147 (qualifying the finding
as dependent on patents serving as an effective means for market protection).
249. Id. at 147.
250. See David J. Kappos & Paul R. Michel, Supreme Court Patent
Decisions Are Stifling Health Care Innovation, MORNING CONSULT (Oct. 29,
2018, 5:00 A.M.), https://perma.cc/BA2G-5BVT (finding that, absent patent
protection, “investors are less interested in funding costly new biomarker
diagnostic research. As a result, diseases will go undiagnosed, and patients
will suffer the consequences”); Ohlhausen, supra note 14, at 125 (“Surveys
reveal that patents contribute to incentives to invest, most acutely in the
bio-pharmaceutical and medical devices fields . . . .”).
251. See Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold to Lead: How
Patent Eligibility Doctrine Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24
GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 94647 (2017) (asserting that the recent Supreme
Court cases regarding patent eligibility “have injected tremendous legal
uncertainty into the U.S. patent system, undermining the ability of inventors,
universities, venture capitalists, and companies to make long-term investment
decisions in R&D”); Ohlhausen, supra note 14, at 122 (“Economic models
predict that, for a given invention, expanding patent scope increases the
incentive to invent. Weak patent protection may therefore lead to suboptimal
investment in technological development.”).
252. See, e.g., Ohlhausen, supra note 14, at 109 (“I worry that today’s calls
for diluted patent rights often go beyond incremental adjustment and threaten
to weaken patents systematically, which could compromise R&D
investment.”).
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Because direct measurements regarding the rate of
innovation are difficult or impossible to obtain, legal and
economic scholars often use R&D data253 and patent counts254 as
proxies for innovation. Closely related to the inquiry central to
this Note, a 2020 study on patent eligibility and investment by
Professor David O. Taylor demonstrates that recent § 101
jurisprudence has negatively impacted investment-making
decisions.255 In his study, Professor Taylor interviewed 475
venture capital and other private equity investors to study the
impact of the Supreme Court’s recent § 101 cases on investment
behaviors.256 Professor Taylor found that 74 percent of investors
considered patent eligibility to be an important factor when
their firms decide to invest in companies developing new
technology.257 Professor Taylor further found that 62 percent of
investors “agreed that their firms are less likely to invest [in
companies developing patent-ineligible technologies] given the
unavailability of patents, while only 20% disagreed.”258
Additionally, Professor Taylor found that investors
overwhelmingly would decrease investment in industries
253. See, e.g., Iain Cockburn & Zvi Griliches, Industry Effects and
Appropriability Measures in the Stock Market’s Valuation of R&D and Patents,
78 AM. ECON. REV. 419, 422 (1988) (“Data on R&D expenditures, where
available, are stronger measures of input to the process by which firms
produce technical innovation than patents are of its ‘output.’”); Glynn S.
Lunney Jr., Patent and Growth: Empirical Evidence from the States, 87 N.C.
L. REV. 1467, 14981500 (2009) (utilizing measures of state-level R&D
spending to evaluate the relationship between patents and economic growth).
254. See, e.g., Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 251, at 955–59 (examining
patent applications that were rejected by the USPTO but granted in the
European and Chinese patent offices, and using that data as a measurement
of innovation).
255. See generally David O. Taylor, Patent Eligibility and Investment, 41
CARDOZO L. REV. 2019, 2070 (2020) [hereinafter Taylor, Patent Eligibility and
Investment] (indicating, among other findings, that “[a]bout 40% of
knowledgeable investors indicated that the Court’s [eligibility] decisions had
somewhat negative or very negative effects on their firms’ existing
investments”).
256. See id. at 2027 (describing the participants and purpose of his 2020
study).
257. See id. at 2054 (“About 43% of the respondents strongly agreed that
patent eligibility is an important consideration when their firms decide
whether to invest in companies developing technology. Another 31% somewhat
agreed with the same proposition.”).
258. Id. at 2054–55.
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lacking patent protection, and that the effect predominated in
the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical devices
industries.259 Importantly, Professor Taylor’s findings confirm
“the idea that patents help spur investment in development of
technology.”260
Likewise, an unpublished study by Professor Arti K. Rai
with Professor Colleen Chien indicates that the state of § 101
has led to a slight decline in patent application filings for
medical diagnostics across small firms.261 Filings by large firms
and nonprofits, however, have grown since Mayo.262 Professors
Rai and Chien also found that the average first claim length in
granted patents for medical diagnostics has increased by 18
percent in the USPTO since 2011.263 Similarly, the average first
claim length for medical diagnostics patents granted in the
European Patent Office (EPO) has increased by 13 percent since
2011.264 These findings indicate that the scope of patent
protection for medical diagnostics patents has narrowed in both
the United States and in Europe following 2011, albeit to a
greater degree in the United States.265
These professors’ findings lend credence to concerns
presented by the NVCA in its amicus brief in Mayo. As
discussed, VC firms look to a company’s assetsespecially
patents or patent protectable technologyand future growth
potential when deciding to invest.266 Supporting Prometheus in
its amicus brief in Mayo, the NVCA argued that rendering

259. See id. at 206567 (“[A]ccording to these investors, on average each
industry would see reduced investment as a result of the elimination of
patents . . . . The industries most negatively impacted would be the
pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device industries.”).
260. Id. at 2055.
261. See Arti K. Rai with Colleen Chien, Intellectual Property in Precision
Medicine 15, fig.4 (Feb. 15, 2018) (unpublished presentation),
https://perma.cc/BF88-Z7Z2 (PDF) (graphically depicting the decline in filings
of medical diagnostic patent applications post-2014).
262. See id. at 14, fig.3 (graphically depicting growth in filings by
non-profits and large firms of patent applications for medical diagnostics
post-2014).
263. Id. at 19.
264. Id.
265. See id. at 20 (“Both EPO and US issued claim lengths are growing;
US claim length has grown more than EPO claim length.”).
266. See supra notes 238241, 244 and accompanying text.
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diagnostic correlations patent ineligible removes the incentive
to invest in companies contributing to personalized medicine.267
This point matters because “emerging personalized medicine
companies do not have access to traditional avenues of funding”
for the millions of dollars necessary to transform an idea into a
finished, FDA-approved diagnostic technology or treatment.268
Professor Taylor’s study demonstrates the veracity of the
investment argument, having found a decrease in venture
capital investors’ willingness to invest in diagnostic technologies
post-Mayo.269
Moreover, the NVCA asserted that diminished protection of
medical diagnostics would “jeopardize[] the billions of dollars
venture firms have already invested in personalized medicine
companies in reliance on patent protection.”270 Professors Rai
and Chien’s finding of increased claim length in U.S. diagnostic
patents may relate to this concern, as one strategy to retain
patent protection in the current § 101 environment could be to
write increasingly narrow, specific claims.271
This Note presents an addition to the discussion of VC
investment attitudes in light of recent § 101 jurisprudence and
affirms the NVCA’s cautionary prediction regarding diagnostic
technologies.
V.

METHODOLOGY AND PREDICTIONS

To assess the effects of the Court’s jurisprudence on VC
investment for diagnostics, this Note empirically analyzes an
existing dataset of VC funding across all industries in the
United States from 20062010 and 20132017. This Part
recounts the study’s methodology, hypothesis, and potential
limitations.

267. NVCA Brief, supra note 17, at 3.
268. Id. at 7.
269. See supra notes 257259 and accompanying text.
270. NVCA Brief, supra note 17, at 3.
271. Alan Douglas Miller & Brian Amos, Successful Strategies for
Diagnostic Method Patents, 23 J. COM. BIOTECHNOLOGY 39, 42 (2017)
(emphasizing the difficulty in obtaining broad diagnostic method claims, but
that one possible tactic for improving patentability under § 101 is to use
narrower claims).
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Hypothesis

Based on anecdotal evidence and caselaw, medical
diagnostics appear to be less able to gain patent protection after
Mayo.272 Moreover, this is widely known within the medical
diagnostic and VC industries.273
If the judicial restrictions on patent eligibility for medical
diagnostic methods cause VC investors to hesitate to invest in
the development of such technology or in companies that plan to
develop such technology (for example, investment in start-ups
through seed funding), then there will be a relative decrease in
VC investment in medical diagnostics following Mayo as
compared to other technological fields where patent eligibility is
unchanged.
B.

Dataset

The Author obtained data for overall VC investment and
investment in disease diagnostic technology for the period of
20062017 using the Pricewater Clearinghouse (PwC)
MoneyTree274 tool. The MoneyTree tool includes data for
verifiable, VC-backed equity funding of private companies.275
PwC verifies data “via (1) various federal and state regulatory
filings; (2) direct confirmation with firm or investor; (3) press
release; or (4) credible media sources.”276 Notably, the
MoneyTree tool excludes data for “[f]unding rounds raised by
public companies,” “government funding,” “[v]enture debt,” and
various non-equity funding “arrangements.”277
272. See supra notes 137, 212216 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 210, 267, 270 and accompanying text.
274. See PwC Moneytree, PWC, https://perma.cc/7WAX-47J7 (last updated
2021) (reporting venture capital investment dollars according to industry,
round, and deals per fiscal quarter). The dataset (including quarterly and
yearly totals) is accessible here: https://perma.cc/2AAQ-6DDZ.
275. See MoneyTreeTM Definitions: Report Methodology, PWC (2020),
https://perma.cc/NS3K-V22Y (“Funding rounds raised by public companies of
any kind on any exchange . . . are excluded from our numbers, even if they
received investment by venture firms.”).
276. Id.
277. Id.; see id. (exemplifying as excludable “business development or R&D
arrangements,” such as when a company forms an “R&D partnership with a
larger corporation,” as that situation “is not equity financing nor is it from
venture capital firms”). Importantly, these “R&D arrangements” differ from
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To ascertain the impact of Bilski and Mayo on investment
trends, the Author first summed quarterly investment totals
within the PwC data to reflect an investment total for each year.
Second, the Author coded the yearly totals for overall VC
investment and investment in disease diagnostics as a numeric
variable.278 The corresponding years were coded too.279 Further,
the Author created a binary (dummy) variable corresponding to
whether a specific year was pre- or post-Mayo.280
C.

Analytical Method

The Author conducted a difference-in-difference (DID)
analysis to compare change in investment amount over time for
disease diagnosis technologies against all other areas of
investment (total VC investment). As compared to other
analytical methods that may merely indicate a correlation
between variables, the results of a DID test demonstrate
causation.281 Additionally, DID inherently “[a]ccounts for
change/change due to factors other than [the] intervention.”282
the typical VC equity investments discussed in this Note. Compare DELOITTE,
LIFE
SCIENCES:
ACCOUNTING
AND
FINANCIAL
REPORTING
UPDATEINTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 2 (2018),
https://perma.cc/6VTJ-ZLFX (PDF) (explaining that in “R&D funding
arrangements” such as “collaborations [between companies], licensing
arrangements, [and] partnerships,” “passive third-party investors . . . provide
funds to offset the cost of R&D programs in exchange for milestone payments
or other forms of consideration”), with What Is Venture Capital?, supra note
227 (“Once the investment into a company has been made, venture capital
[firms] actively engage with a company, providing strategic and operational
guidance, connecting entrepreneurs with investors and customers, taking a
board seat at the company, and hiring employees.”).
278. Data for overall investment and investment in disease diagnostic
technologies was stacked within the same numeric variable: [dis_diagnosis].
279. This was coded as a numeric variable: [year]. When the Author
performed the DID analysis in R, this variable was used to define a new binary
variable: [post2012].
280. This was coded as a binary variable: [dummy]. When the Author
performed the DID estimator analysis in R, this variable was used to define a
new binary variable: [treatment].
281. See Difference-in-Difference Estimation, COLUM. PUB. HEALTH:
POPULATION HEALTH METHODS, https://perma.cc/9H77-XPP6 (last updated
Dec. 23, 2021, 10:20 AM) (“DID is a quasi-experimental design that makes use
of longitudinal data from treatment and control groups to obtain an
appropriate counterfactual to estimate a causal effect.”).
282. Id.
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Economists and legal scholars routinely utilize the DID
technique to analyze the impact of a treatmentfor instance,
the enactment of a specific policy measure or use of a specific
health interventionon two equivalent groups.283 The essential
assumption regarding equivalence relates to the concept of
causation: but for the treatment, both groups would exhibit
parallel trends over time.284 This may be examined visually,285
as the Author did in the present study. The Author plotted the
average yearly values for total VC investment and for disease
diagnosis technologies as a function of time. Both investment
categories exhibited a positive trend.
Utilizing 2012 (Mayo) as a dividing line to compare the
rates of change in total VC investment and investment in
disease diagnosis technologies, the Author analyzed data over
two four-year intervals of time: 20062010 (through Bilski) and
20132017 (following Mayo). The present analysis excludes data
from 20112012 because, given that Bilski was decided in 2010
and Mayo was decided in 2012, VC investment decisions during
that period would not have been affected by both Bilski and
Mayo. Likewise, because the Court decided Mayo in 2012, the
Author contends that its effects on VC investment may not be
seen in full force until the following calendar year. Prior to
analyzing the data in R, the Author plotted the data as a line
graph to assess whether the parallel-trend assumption was met.
The data met the parallel-trend assumption.
D.

Limitations

As with most empirical research, the methodology and data
source employed in this study have limitations that may affect
283. See generally Colleen P. Murphy et al., Note-Taking Mode and
Academic Performance in Two Law School Courses, 68 J. LEGAL EDUC. 207
(2019) (using the DID method to calculate impact on 2L student GPA from use
of varied 1L note-taking techniques); Eric M. Gaier et al., Empirical Analysis
of Causation and Damages in Off-Label Marketing Cases, BATES WHITE ECON.
CONSULTING D-7D-8 (Apr. 2013) (describing the DID technique in the context
of proving causation in FDA off-label cases).
284. See Difference-in-Difference Estimation, supra note 281 (“The parallel
trend assumption . . . requires that in the absence of treatment, the difference
between the ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ group is constant over time.”).
285. See id. (“Although there is no statistical test for this assumption,
visual inspection is useful when you have observations over many time
points.”).
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the results and implications discussed in the balance of this
Note.286 First, investment in research and product development
comes from many sourcesventure capital, contractual
agreements between companies, the federal government, and
private company self-funding, to name a few. This analysis only
accounts for venture capital investment and must be interpreted
with that limitation in mind. As previously discussed, VC firms
and the federal government have differing motivations to
invest287 that may impact the volume of investment in medical
diagnostic technologies following Bilski and Mayo.
Second, the Author did not directly collect this data and
rather found it in aggregate form. Direct collection of data from
VC firms may provide more meaningful results as the
investment patterns for disease diagnostics technologies could
be attributed to specific firms that target primarily biotech and
personalized medicine companies.288 It is possible that firms
whose investors keep up with the recent developments in § 101
jurisprudence will tread more lightly than more general VC
firms whose investors may not be as informed about the
ever-changing doctrine of patentable subject matter.289
Third, the DID analysisalthough indirectly accounting for
confounding variables because of the comparison of investment
trends in medical diagnostics to the counterfactual trend (i.e.,
other industries that are generally unaffected by Bilski and
Mayo)does not directly account for factors such as the state of
the economy, productivity, poverty levels, and international
286. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1187 (2011) (“All projects involving
empirical studies of legal decisions have limitations . . . .”); Kathryn Zeiler,
The Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Where Might We Go from Here?,
66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 78, 81 (2016) (“The usefulness of empirical legal research,
however, depends heavily on the methods employed to produce it and on the
validity of the inferences drawn from reported results.”).
287. See supra notes 231235 and accompanying text.
288. Of course, this would be a herculean task. It is impractical to
individually survey hundreds of VC firms to collect investment data
independently. Utilizing PwC’s dataset was a logical alternative for this Note.
289. See, e.g., Taylor, Patent Eligibility and Investment, supra note 255, at
2060 (finding that “while eligibility knowledgeable investors and eligibility
unknowledgeable investors both report that patent eligibility is an important
consideration when their firms make decisions to invest in companies
developing technology, eligibility knowledgeable investors place greater
importance on patent eligibility”).
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affairs. A longer, larger scale project of the same nature as the
current study would benefit from direct data collectionand
complex econometric modeling as the methodologyto account
for some of these potential confounding variables.
VI. RESULTS
The Author calculated the DID statistic through two
avenues: manually and through an ordinary least-squares
(OLS) regression. The Author started by calculating the DID
statistic manually. First, the Author calculated the time trend
in the control (all technologies) group by subtracting the average
yearly investment level post-Mayo from the average yearly
investment level pre-Mayo. Next, the Author calculated the time
trend in the “treatment” (disease diagnosis technologies) group
by subtracting the average yearly investment level post-Mayo
from the average yearly investment level pre-Mayo. Lastly, the
Author calculated the DID statistic by subtracting the time
trend value in the control group from the time trend in the
treatment group. Manual calculation of the DID statistic
produced a negative value.290 The negative value indicates a
negative relationship between Mayo (the independent variable)
and VC funding for medical diagnostics (the dependent
variable).
The Author also ran an OLS regression to confirm the
manual DID estimate of the effect of Mayo and Bilski on the
level of VC investment in disease diagnosis technologies and to
calculate the significance of that effect.291 The coefficient
estimate of the interaction between the treatment (change in
§ 101 jurisprudence) on the treated group (investment levels in
disease diagnosis technologies) matched the manually
calculated value.292 Further, the regression data indicated that
the negative relationship between Mayo and VC investment in
medical diagnostics is statistically significant.293 In essence, in
290. The manually calculated DID statistic was -9285961000.
291. The OLS regression model was coded as follows:
reg1 = lm(dis_diagnosis ~post2012 + treatment + post2012*treatment, data =
mayoeffect).
292. The coefficient estimate equaled -9.286e9.
293. The relationship was statistically significant, p = 2.82e-14, R2 = 0.9. In
practical terms, “[s]tatistical significance helps quantify whether a result is
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the four years following Mayo, investment in disease diagnostic
technologies was nearly $9.3 billion dollars lower than it would
have been absent Mayo.294 However, it is important to note that
the yearly investment totals for disease diagnostic technologies
have generally increased in the years following Mayo—but they
have increased at a lower rate compared to all other industries.
Thus, another general way to conceptualize the data is that VC
investment for all technologies increased much more than the
increase in investment for disease diagnostic technologies over
the period analyzed.
VII. APPLYING DATA TO INNOVATION FRAMEWORK AND § 101
JURISPRUDENCE
This Part describes several key implications from the
results discussed above. First, this Note’s findings support calls
to Congress for reform of § 101 following Ariosa and Athena to
provide greater certainty and clarity regarding patent eligibility
of medical diagnostics. As one Federal Circuit judge noted, “The
multiple concurring and dissenting opinions regarding the
denial[s] of en banc rehearing [of Athena and Ariosa] are
illustrative of how fraught the issue of § 101 eligibility,
especially as applied to medical diagnostics patents, is.”295
Moreover, Judges Hughes and Moore specifically called on
Congress to clarify § 101.296
Many prominent figures in patent law have echoed the
Federal Circuit’s concerns about patent eligible subject matter
in written testimony presented to the Senate Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee on Intellectual Property during the

likely due to chance or to some factor of interest.” Amy Gallo, A Refresher on
BUS.
REV.
(Feb.
16,
2016),
Statistical
Significance,
HARV.
https://perma.cc/E6PZ-7C4L (quoting Tom Redman). The significance level “is
usually expressed as a ‘p-value,’ and the lower the p-value, the less likely the
results are due purely to chance.” Id.
294. This situation is the counterfactual (i.e., had the treated group not
received treatment, its mean value would be the same distance from the
control group in the post-treatment period as it was in the pre-treatment
period).
295. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 927 F.3d 1333,
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Hughes, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en
banc).
296. See supra notes 214, 216 and accompanying text.
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June 2019 Senate hearings on “The State of Patent Eligibility in
America”297 (“Patent Eligibility Hearings”). For instance, Judge
Paul Michel, a retired Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, stated
that “recent cases are unclear, inconsistent with one another
and confusing. . . . That applies equally to Supreme Court and
Federal Circuit cases.”298 Judge Michel specifically mentioned
the Mayo/Alice regime, asserting that it “conflates eligibility
with novelty and non-obviousness . . . creat[ing] impossible
confusion.”299 This observation hits at a key point of Judge
Linn’s concurring opinion in Ariosa, in which he called out the
Mayo Court’s “blanket dismissal of conventional post-solution
steps” as prohibiting future courts from distinguishing Mayo
from other diagnostic method patents involving “conventional”
steps.300
Similarly, a number of legal academics who study IP and
innovation have called for patent eligibility reform. Professor
David Taylor’s testimony at the Patent Eligibility Hearings
emphasized what he saw as several judges “not[ing] they were
disturbed” by the Federal Circuit’s denial of en banc rehearing
in Ariosa.301 “[A] resulting concern” stemming from inconsistent
and confusing opinions in the judiciary “is that the current
[§ 101] environment substantially reduces incentives to invest
in research and development.”302 The central finding of this
Notethat VC firms’ investment rate in disease diagnosis
technologies has slowed as a result of Bilski and
Mayosupports that concern. Professor Adam Mossoff’s
testimony at the Patent Eligibility Hearings in turn stressed the
high rates of invalidations and rejections of medical diagnostic
patents following Mayo and Alice as “revealing because the
Alice-Mayo framework is often accused of being indeterminate
297. The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Hearing Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, 116th Cong. (2019)
[hereinafter The State of Patent Eligibility in America].
298. Id. at 3 (statement of Judge Paul Michel, Former C.J., United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
299. Id. at 6.
300. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (Linn, J., concurring).
301.
The State of Patent Eligibility in America, supra note 297, at 4
(statement of Prof. David O. Taylor, Associate Professor of Law, Southern
Methodist University Dedman School of Law).
302. Id. at 5.
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and providing little predictability for inventors or lawyers in
how a judge or examiner at the USPTO may choose to apply
it.”303 Professor Mossoff echoed Judge Moore’s dissent in the
denial of en banc rehearing in Athena, averring that § 101 “does
appear to offer some predictability: the odds of receiving or
keeping a patent under § 101 are not in your favor if you are
innovating new products and services in . . . medical
diagnostics, medical devices, and other inventions driving the
U.S. innovation economy.”304
Moreover, Professor Mark Lemleywho is generally
supportive of retaining the “two hundred years of rules that
have prevented patent law from locking up the fundamental
building blocks of nature”305asserted that any reform to § 101
should “focus narrowly on identified problems in the medical
diagnostics business.”306 Congress should answer these calls for
reform of § 101 in a manner that “target[s] the effect of Mayo on
medical diagnostics”307 and reinstates incentives to invest in the
development of new medical diagnostic technologies.
Second, the present study provides empirical evidence that
complements and further supports some of the key findings in
Professor Taylor’s recent study about investment behavior
following Mayo and Alice. For instance, Professor Taylor found
a statistically significant correlation between investors’
familiarity with Supreme Court patent eligibility cases and the
importance of patent eligibility in making investment
decisions.308 Moreover, he posited that the correlation between

303. The State of Patent Eligibility in America, supra note 297, at 8
(statement of Prof. Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law, George Mason University
Antonin Scalia School of Law).
304. Id.; see Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 927
F.3d 1333, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (Moore, J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc) (“Since Mayo, we have held every single diagnostic
claim in every case before us ineligible.”); id. at 1354 (“We have turned Mayo
into a per se rule that diagnostic kits and techniques are ineligible.”).
305. The State of Patent Eligibility in America, supra note 297, at 2
(statement of Prof. Mark A. Lemley, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See Taylor, Patent Eligibility and Investment, supra note 255, at 2060
(“Those with this familiarity reported greater agreement that patent eligibility
is an important consideration when their firms decide whether to invest in
companies developing technology.”).
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investor knowledge of § 101 doctrine and importance of patent
eligibility as an investment consideration “may indicate that the
more an investor learns about the Supreme Court’s eligibility
cases, the more that knowledge (here, eligibility) impacts
investment decisions.”309 Although the empirical study in this
Note did not directly measure VC knowledge of § 101
jurisprudence, the NVCA has indicated, through its amicus brief
in Mayo, that VC firms closely followand regard as
importantthe Supreme Court’s precedential decisions
impacting patent eligibility of medical diagnostics.310 Indeed,
the NVCA indicated that the decline in rate of VC investment in
disease diagnostic technologies would follow restrictive
interpretations of § 101 as it applies to medical diagnostics.311
The current project also complements Professor Taylor’s
findings that the Supreme Court’s patent eligibility cases
caused an overall decrease in investment among 49 percent of
firms.312 This finding could help explain the decline in rate of
investment in disease diagnosis technologies exemplified
through the present study. Although some firms will proceed
more cautiously following Mayo, Bilski, and Alice, other firms
may continue their investment patterns prior to those cases or
even increase investment.313
Third, while the DID analysis shows a relative decrease in
VC investment for disease diagnosis technologies as compared
to all technologies,314 the raw data indicates that VC investment
for disease diagnosis technologies continues to increase. The
Author also plotted yearly investment totals for the disease
diagnosis technologies through 2019, and that data
demonstrates a continued increase in investment for disease
diagnosis technologies. This finding suggests that even if patent
309. Taylor, Patent Eligibility and Investment, supra note 255, at 2060.
310. See supra notes 229, 267268 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 229, 267268 and accompanying text.
312. See Taylor, Patent Eligibility and Investment, supra note 255, at 2074
(noting as well that “the percentage of these investors who reported increasing
investments as a result of the Supreme Court’s known eligibility decisions
stood at 8%, significantly below the percentage indicating decreased
investments at 49%”).
313. See id. at 2074 (highlighting that 9 percent of firm representatives
responded “other” to the question of how particular Supreme Court cases
affected firm investment decisions).
314. See supra Part VI.
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rights for medical diagnostics are unavailable, there will still be
some innovation in that space.315 The question remains,
however, if “some” innovation will be enough given the medical
field’s emphasis on personalized medicine.
Fourth, underinvestment in medical diagnostics may lead
to underinvestment in potential treatments, particularly for
rare or genetically-based conditions. Medical diagnostics receive
immense attention in the scientific community because
physicians and researchers need to know how to diagnose a
disease in order to create efficacious, targeted treatments.316
Knowledge of a disease’s biological mechanism will aid
researchers in the development of drugs or biologics that
uniquely target the biomarkers associated with that disease.317
For instance, the drugs imatinib and nilotinib were developed
using rational drug design to specifically target the BCR-ABL
genetic mutation present in patients with CML and Ph-positive
ALL.318 Fortunately for innovators developing precision
treatments, the Federal Circuit in Athena conceded the patent

315. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1586–89 (2003) (discussing ex post rewards and ex ante
subsidies for successful innovation and noting that “there is every reason to
believe that achieving optimal innovation in different industries will require
greater or lesser measures of legal incentive”and not necessarily patent
rights as the legal incentive); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette,
Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 31719 (2013)
(describing the historical use of performance-based prizes to incentivize
innovation, and contemporary use of private and U.S. government agency
performance-based prize funds to spur developments in STEM); id. at 32226
(discussing provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that permit “the
expensing of research and experimental expenditures (Section 174) and the
credit for increasing research activities (Section 41)”).
316. See Gary Kurtzman, A Business Model for a New Generation of
Diagnostics Companies, 2 BIOTECH. HEALTHCARE 50, 51 (2005) (“[T]argeted
therapies typically require an accompanying diagnostic test to identify
candidates for the therapy . . . .”); id. at 50 (“We now are able to begin to
determine the best treatment approach for some cancers, based on the genetics
of the tumor or the genetic makeup of the patient.”).
317. See Soma Mandal et al., Rational Drug Design, 625 EUR. J.
PHARMACOLOGY 90, 91 (2009) (explaining that small molecule prodrugs bind to
a biomolecule that “play[s a] critical role in disease progression” and either (1)
“inhibit[] [its] function,” (2) “inhibit[] [its] biomolecular interactions” with
other biomolecules, or (3) “activat[e] biomolecules (for normal functions) that
are functionally deregulated in some diseases such as cancer”).
318. See id. at 92 (discussing the drugs and their efficacy).
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eligibility of treatment methods.319 Small molecule drugs may
also be eligible for patent protection under § 101 as chemical
compositions.320 However, patent protection for the treatment or
drug alone may not be enough to incentivize the up-front R&D
costs necessary to identify the biomarker of a disease. Thus, the
concerns about decreased funding for R&D of medical diagnostic
technologies are certainly credible.
Lastly, the findings of this Note suggest that VC firms
employ a higher degree of caution when assessing whether to
invest in a company aiming to develop diagnostic technologies.
Thus, individuals may face greater barriers in forming start-up
companies devoted to researching and developing novel disease
diagnostic methods. Indeed, Judge Paul Michel noted this
potential consequence of the restrictive § 101 doctrine in his
testimony during the Patent Eligibility Hearings.321 But funding
for R&D is only step one. The hypothetical company will need
funding not only to engage in research to find a biological
correlation between a biomarker and a disease and to develop a
reliable method of detecting said biomarker, but also to
commercialize a diagnostic test, to seek patent protection, and
to fund clinical trials to obtain FDA approval.322

319. See Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 915 F.3d
743, 752–53 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 855 (2020) (“Claiming a
natural cause of an ailment and well-known means of observing it is not
eligible for patent because such a claim in effect only encompasses the natural
law itself. But claiming a new treatment for an ailment, albeit using a natural
law, is not claiming the natural law.”).
320. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (enumerating “composition[s] of matter” as a
category of patent eligible subject matter).
321. The State of Patent Eligibility in America, supra note 297, at 2
(statement of Judge Paul Michel, Former C.J., United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit) (“Uncertainty, unpredictability, inconsistent results
and undue and harmful exclusions of new technologies abound. Consequently,
patents are considered unreliable by the very peoplebusiness executives and
innovation investors like venture capital firmswho make the necessary, but
risky, investments. The results point to decreased formation of
start-ups . . . .”).
322. See KEELING ET AL., supra note 5, at 1 (“[T]he cost to develop and
commercialize a diagnostic is subject to a considerable investment range,
depending on the test positioning and novelty.”).
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CONCLUSION

Personalized medicine has revolutionized healthcare by
enabling physicians to provide patient-tailored treatments. Part
of this success stems from the use of medical diagnostics tests to
determine that a patient has a certain condition or disease, and
to ensure that the patient qualifies for related treatments.
Unfortunately, the confusing, inconsistent interpretations of
§ 101 and of the judicial exclusions to § 101 have created an
environment where medical diagnostics have been deemed
patent ineligible.
This Note has demonstrated that the uncertainty following
Bilski and Mayo has led to a decrease in the rate of VC
investment in disease diagnosis technologies as compared to the
overall rate of VC investment. This result adds to a body of
research confirming concerns of professors, judges, and industry
players alikethat the current state of § 101 disincentivizes
investment in medical diagnostics. Although VC investment is
not the sole method of funding research, to burgeoning start-up
companies creating medical diagnostic technologies it is the sine
qua non of ensuring growth and a path towards
commercialization of their products. To keep a competitive edge
in the global pharmaceutical and medical diagnostics
industries, § 101 should receive Congress’s immediate
attention.

